



**C-COM 9-1-1 Operations Review:
Wildfire / Evacuation Events
September 5-24, 2020**

**As Presented by
SCGI-Performance Management**

Farmers battle on as wildfires roar in Clackamas County. (Photo: Joe Rhoades)

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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ARC: American Red Cross

BC: Battalion Chief

C911: Columbia 911 Communications District (St. Helens, Oregon)

CAD: Computer Aided Dispatch

CCDM: Clackamas County Disaster Management

C-COM: Clackamas County 9-1-1 Communications

CCSO: Clackamas County Sheriff's Office

CFS: Calls for Service (Radio Dispatched Calls)

E-Board: C-COM Executive Board

EMS: Emergency Medical Systems

EMT: Executive Management Team (County Department Directors)

ESF-2: Emergency Support Function 2 (which centers on communications infrastructure)

EOC: Emergency Operations Center

FOC: Fire Operations Center

FSA: Fire Station Alerting

GIS: Geospatial Information Systems

IAP: Incident Action Plan

ICP: Incident Command Post

ICS: Incident Command System (or Structure)

IMT: Incident Management Team

LOCOM: Lake Oswego Communications (Lake Oswego, Oregon)

MAJCS: Multi-Area Joint CAD System

MDC/MDT: Mobile Data Computers / Mobile Data Terminals (laptops used by fire/police users)

PIC: Public Inquiry Center

PGE: Portland General Electric

SCGI: Stuart Consulting Group, Inc.

USDD: U.S. Digital Designs (Company name for Fire Station Alerting)

WCCCA: Washington County Consolidated Communications Agency (Beaverton, Oregon)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Executive Board and Director of Clackamas County 9-1-1 (C-COM) retained SCGI to conduct a thorough review of 9-1-1 performance following the agency's response during the wildfires that affected Clackamas County, Oregon, in September 2020.

This review focuses specifically on C-COM operations and the delivery of 911 services. Elements of this included a review of agency leadership, decision-making, execution, and effectiveness at providing continuity of emergency communications of a high quality in the days immediately prior to the wildfires, which began on September 7th, during the evacuation which occurred on September 10th, and through the return to the normal operations on September 23rd, 2020.

Other reviews have been initiated by partner and member agencies in the weeks following the wildfires that address the response and effectiveness of other public safety agencies in the ground-level response to the fires specifically. We recommend that these reports be reviewed, once they are published for a look at the larger context in which C-COM operated.

Evacuations of 9-1-1 centers are rare. Out of the nearly 7,000 emergency communication centers across the United States, evacuations for unscheduled events almost never occur. While the majority of these centers have some form of back-up capacity, they are rarely used and when used, most commonly for training purposes or in the event of short-lived technical systems failures. While most centers are required to have some form of documented strategies, their evacuation plans are rarely executed on short notice and for long duration events.

C-COM is now the exception. The smooth, successful, and rapid evacuation of the center, while maintaining continuity and quality of service during an unprecedented and protracted threat to public safety, will become a model for other emergency communications centers throughout the United States.

This was accomplished in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic which began directly affecting the center in March 2020. Measures taken to address the pandemic significantly complicated C-COM's execution of this evacuation. Work-from-home measures remained in place wherever reasonable throughout the evacuation response, putting an additional strain on the entire team.

9-1-1 Centers are notorious for fostering toxic work cultures. These cultures protean in their ability to adapt to different leaders while maintaining deep-seated negativity. Workplace cultures of that nature never respond well to profound changes in working conditions. Only a vital and healthy workplace culture can respond to significant challenges without cutting service, damaging relationships and reputations, and putting public safety at risk for personal comfort.

The C-COM team was found to have a healthy workplace. The team, at every level, has worked tirelessly for the last two years to create a culture that adapts, learns, flexes, all the while providing excellent customer service. The months of restrictions imposed due to the pandemic, while draining on the entire team, also served to strengthen their determination to do whatever it takes to provide the essential link between the public and first responders.

That link, through the unrelenting challenges of the pandemic response, through the wildfires and subsequent evacuation scenario, and through significant virus-related staffing impacts following the return to the center on September 24th, has not been broken, nor was the quality of

service found to have been compromised despite tremendous external pressures brought on by both the incidents themselves and community wide response.

It is likely that this story will never make it to the public, but it is worth the telling, nonetheless.

LIMITATIONS OF THIS REVIEW

This Operations Review is specifically limited to C-COM as a 9-1-1 organization, its operations, and decisions only. To the extent that decisions made or actions taken by other departments or response agencies affected C-COM's ability to deliver its mission-critical services, they may be referenced here; however, this report will not seek to contextualize or answer for decisions made outside of C-COM's leadership. Other agencies may address and evaluate their own actions through their own reviews as they see fit.

This review is limited to events beginning September 5th, 2020, and concluding September 24th, 2020.

C-COM is a department within Clackamas County. It is structured with two leadership decision-making bodies giving direction simultaneously: The County Commission, through the County Administrator, as well as C-COM's Governing Board providing financial and advisory support through the Department's Director, Cheryl Bledsoe. This model is uncommon in the western United States. While clarity (of values, vision, and mission) and alignment (of rules, roles, responsibilities, and resources) are of paramount importance in emergency communications centers, and while this model does not make such an essential state easy to achieve or sustain, this review does not evaluate the impact of this governance model in C-COM's operations as it responded to this series of events.

This review does not evaluate the Center's financial readiness for costly events such as this one; however financial impacts, related to this incident, will be included for reference and consideration for future contingency fund planning.

This review does not evaluate C-COM's training program other than tangentially vis-à-vis the performance of newer employees and those recently promoted to expanded leadership positions.



C-COM'S OPERATIONS & SERVICE AREA

C-COM STAFFING

At the time of this incident, C-COM was budgeted for 53.75 full-time positions. C-COM's actual staffing level was 50.75 employees with the following staff assignments:

- 30 Call-Takers & Dispatchers were actively working throughout these events,
 - 7 employees participated as certified 9-1-1 Call-Takers
 - 23 employees participated as Dispatchers or Lead Dispatchers
- 5 supervisors and 2 Training & Quality Assurance Coordinators floated between both evacuation sites
 - 2 were on medical leave at the start of this incident, but returned mid-evacuation
- 8 Technicians & Administrative Staff were actively working throughout these events, floating between both locations as needed,
- 2 Call-Taking Trainees were paused in their training program and provided administrative assistance with facility readiness and logistical support errands throughout the evacuation,
- The EMS Quality Assurance Coordinator was assigned to the EOC and was not directly engaged in C-COM's response to this incident,
- The .75 FTE Records Clerk continued to work remotely and was involved in this event primarily from a public records aspect, and,
- 2 employees were on FMLA Leave throughout the duration of these events.

C-COM MEMBER AGENCIES


C-COM provides emergency radio dispatch services for 6 law enforcement agencies and 9 fire districts and departments. C-COM answers 9-1-1 calls for all residents of Clackamas County, except for residents within the city limits of Lake Oswego, West Linn and Milwaukie, whose 9-1-1 calls are answered by Lake Oswego 9-1-1 (LOCOM).

C-COM provides emergency dispatch services for:

Law Enforcement Agencies	Fire Departments
Clackamas County Sheriff's Office	Clackamas Fire District #1
Oregon City Police Department	Aurora Fire District
Canby Police Department	Canby Fire District
Gladstone Police Department	Gladstone Fire Department
Molalla Police Department	Molalla Fire District
Sandy Police Department	Sandy Fire District
	Hoodland Fire District
	Colton Fire District

C-COM SERVICE AREA MAP

The following map outlines the boundaries of the 9-1-1 Public Safety Answering Points. The area which belongs to C-COM is roughly mid-center and geographically spans from the iconic Mount Hood on the eastern border to SE Portland on the northern border, along I-5 on the western boarder and to Marion County on the southern border.



C-COM 2019-2020 STATISTICS

The Call Volume Data for both 2019 and 2020 is included below. It is notable that during the month of September, during the time period for this incident, C-COM took 25% of its total non-emergency call volume for the entire year in one month.

The overall impact of the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in lower-than-average call volume and “calls for service” (emergency dispatches); however, the numbers specifically during the month of September accounted for 16% of the total call volume for all of 2020.

It is also important to note that while C-COM was evacuated to LOCOM, text-to-911 was turned off so that existing call-takers could focus on incoming voice calls. During these dates, any attempts to text 911 would have received an automated kickback message, informing residents that this service had been turned off.

Raw Call Volume:

PHONE CALLS	2020	September 2020	2019	% Change
911 Calls	143,585	12,861 (9%)	143,535	+ <1%
Non-Em Calls	139,204	34,289 (25%)	125,556	+11%
Text Incidents	372	85 (23%)	304	+22%
TOTAL CALLS	283,161	47,150 (16%)	269,395	+5%

Call for Service (CFS) Statistics:

RADIO DISPATCH	2020	2019	% Change
Law Dispatch	185,795	207,995	-10.7%
Fire Dispatch	9,958	7,745	+28.6%
EMS Dispatch	27,086	29,554	-8%
TOTAL CFS	222,839	245,294	-9%


THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Since the beginning of March 2020 and throughout C-COM's response to the wildfires, COVID-19 pandemic responses formed the backdrop for every decision that needed to be made. The complexity this created cannot be overstated for a 9-1-1 operations center that typical works in close proximity, as a team, required to communicate regularly on situations as they occur throughout the county.

Prior to the September wildfires, C-COM had already had to space out their 9-1-1 operations floor to ensure compliance with social distancing requirements, deployed symptom-evaluation protocols and had been communicating regularly with their employees regarding the emergency conditions, created by the pandemic.

In addition, C-COM's Technical Team had already begun researching remote connectivity for call-taking and emergency dispatching, under the presumption that a large-scale quarantine may require creative ways of ensuring continuous staffing.

In addition, C-COM had shifted all of their technical and administrative staff to primarily work outside of their facility in order to maintain the health of operations employees who were not able to work from home to provide mission critical services





Cases in Clackamas County began to climb again as summer ended and people were driven indoors by both the smoke of the wildfires and increasing spread of the virus.

The included graph illustrates the COVID-19 cases during the period assessed by this report.


THE WILDFIRES

Roughly 1.07 million acres burned during the 2020 Wildfire season, the second-most on record. The cost to fight the fires was also high, reportedly over \$650 million, and rising, as of December 1, 2020.

While the total acres burned is lower than the 2012 season, the speed of the fires, along with the proximity to densely populated areas, Clackamas County included, set this wildfire event apart.



By the numbers: Acres burned in Oregon wildfires



Source: Northwest Interagency Coordination Center


From 2015-2019, Oregon lost a combined 93 homes due to wildfire, according to the Northwest Interagency Coordination Center. 2020 Wildfires resulted in 4,009 homes destroyed.

The wildfires which affected residents inside Clackamas County, occurred in the following areas:

- Riverside Fire (Estacada), which affected 138,027 acres around Estacada,
- Beachie/Lionshead Fire, which affected 46,323 acres on the Clackamas County side of this fire (larger footprint extended into Marion County),
- North Cascades Fires, combined the 4 following fires:
 - Dowty Road, which affected 1,509 acres in and around Eagle Creek,
 - Wilhoit Fire, which affected 532 acres in and around Molalla
 - Unger Road (Colton), which affected 497 acres in and around Colton,
 - Graves Creek, which affected 46 acres.

The included map outlines the areas affected by each of these fires:

It is in this context that C-COM operated.



The Warning

As the Labor Day Weekend approached, weather forecasts indicated the potential for disastrous wildfires. Dry weather, high winds, high temperatures, low humidity combined to create a potentially hazardous environment. Aggressive wildland fire suppression also led to an extensive buildup of dry fuels in the forests that, when subjected to high temperatures and winds, have led to the return of what the Oregon Department of Forestry calls “megafires.” Moreover, Oregon’s growing population has created a larger urban/wildland interface where wildfires can quickly encroach on residential complexes.

On Saturday evening, September 5th, Director Cheryl Bledsoe was notified by email of a notification from PGE of a possible public safety power shut off and weather alert. Director Bledsoe concurrently notified her leadership team.

On Sunday morning, C-COM Leadership Team participated in the PGE briefing and were informed of the agency’s plan to de-energize the power grid over an extensive amount of C-COM’s coverage area, impacting approximately 2,400 landlines in the Mount Hood area of Clackamas County. This decision was in anticipation of high winds, to minimize wildfire risk. The C-COM Leadership team spent the next several hours communicating with supervisors, employees, member board, and stakeholders to prepare for the impacts, as community notifications began.

By Monday, September 7th, forecasts estimated higher than originally expected winds were reported with gusts of 55-70 mph to begin earlier than expected, in the afternoon. C-COM requested a fire liaison, from the Clackamas Fire Defense Board, to be on-site inside C-COM during the storm. The Fire Operations Center (FOC) was activated at 1700. BC303 served as the initial Fire Liaison inside C-COM.


The windstorm began, in earnest, at approximately 1800 hours on Monday. PGE power grid shut off in phases beginning at approximately 1900 hours.

The Fires

By 2000 hours on Monday, September 7th, fires had begun sparking and spreading throughout the county, due to the winds and the heat involved in this incident.

The emergency response system experienced its first significant technical failure when the Clackamette Park Fire burned through the fiber line between CCSO North Station and C-COM impacting MDC/MDT usage for public safety responders. Additionally, the US Digital Fire Station Alerting stopped working.

**Power shutoff
near Mt. Hood
may be needed
to protect
public safety.**



Clackamette Park Fire, View 1

Requests for community evacuation notices begin at 0018 hours on September 8th. In the next 24 hours, there will be 34 evacuation notices sent out through the Everbridge Notification System. On September 9-10th, an additional 36 evacuation notices were distributed. Additional



notices were provided, in the days ahead, for reductions in the evacuation level as risk decreased.

Creation and activation of the early notifications fell to C-COM Supervisors between September 8th and mid-day on September 9th which impacted their ability to supervise the operations center.

C-COM leadership made a decision to insert several employees into the Emergency Operations Center to assist with notifications so these could be removed from the 911 operations floor. Eventually, Bill Conway was transitioned into the wildfire EOC from the COVID EOC to provide assistance with notifications. The initial notices were short burst messaging that were not accompanied by website updates or accurate GIS maps. This resulted in a number of calls into the 9-1-1 operations floor, seeking additional information and to verify the evacuation alerts.

The Public Information Center phone line was available for the community for generally day-time business hours; however, the PIC did not appear to have accurate or credible information about the evacuations which resulted in the community being directed to call 9-1-1 or C-COM's non-emergency phone line which dramatically increased call volume each time a community alert was distributed. Additionally, due to gaps in available information, some cities began staffing their own Public Inquiry lines for their community. This occurred in both Lake Oswego and Oregon City which, while helpful in providing after-hours coverage when the Clackamas PIC closed down, may have resulted in additional confusion for residents.

On Tuesday, September 8th, Clackamas County declared a state of emergency, related to the wildfires. Call volumes continue to rise on this day to 5x normal call volume. Director Bledsoe informed the E-Board of dramatic call volume increases. The Oregon State Fire Marshall did not initially have resources to offer Clackamas County, due to wildfires in other parts of the State.

The workload at C-COM continued to increase. For September, typical daily call volume is approximately 800 calls per day. As the wildfire response developed, call volumes ranges from 2-5x normal call volumes. Every employee stepped up, including the newest ones, and performed exceptionally.

C-COM Leadership officially assigned four internal Incident Command System positions for internal department management. These were assigned as follows:

- C-COM Incident Commander: Cheryl Bledsoe
 - Internal/External Communications
 - Decision-Making Authority

- C-COM Operations Chief: Tony Collins
 - Operational Stability
 - Schedule Management

- C-COM Planning Chief: Toni Sexton
 - Technical Contingency Planning
 - Evacuation Planning

- C-COM Logistics Chief: Meg Neece
 - Employee Care Issues (Food, Lodging)
 - Peer Support Liaison / Employee Check-In



PGE continued to hold daily briefings, as high winds continued. This was determined to ultimately be an extremely rare weather event, called Diablo Santa Ana, occurring only once or twice per century on the West Coast. Wind speeds on Mount Hood were clocked at and above 100 mph. Speed of fires increased. Damage intensified. Services were down for nearly 100,000 PGE customers and service could not be restored until winds stopped and damage on Mount Hood could be assessed. Winds were forecasted to slow on Thursday, September 10th.

In the afternoon on September 8th, C-COM employees found their personal residences within evacuation zones and supervisors began sending people home so they could evacuate. C-COM was notified that the American Red Cross (ARC) had hotel vouchers available for employees who needed to evacuate. Meg Neece, C-COM's Executive Assistant, worked directly with the ARC to coordinate hotel vouchers and sleeping plans for employees who were evacuating. This voucher process was difficult because ARC wanted to see employees in person to verify their need. This impacted C-COM operations because, in some cases, employees returned to work due to the intense workload that was underway. 13 employees had to evacuate from their homes.

The on-going and sustained workload resulted in the need to begin to work on creative approaches to staffing, due to the high risk of burnout or employees being affected by wildfires. Director Bledsoe worked with both LOCOM and Columbia 9-1-1 to put surge staffing agreements in place.

By Wednesday, September 9th, employees had been sleeping on the floor, the center itself was becoming hot and internally smoky. The C-COM leadership team recognized the need to provide meals and food access for C-COM employees on-site as the workload remained intense. Cots were also brought into C-COM.

The information coming out of the EOC was highly limited for C-COM. The first Situation Report was released on 9/9/20 at about 1800 hours. C-COM Leadership struggled to determine who was in command and in important liaison positions. The first Incident Action Plan (IAP) was released on 9/11/20.

THE DECISION TO EVACUATE C-COM

On the morning of Thursday, September 10th, C-COM understood that a Type 2 Incident Management Team (IMT) would be coming into Clackamas County to begin to manage the wildfire activity. As such, Operations Manager Tony Collins, worked on understanding the



dispatch needs relating to this change in structure. C-COM was unsure whether this would result in on-site tactical dispatch or whether they would need to continue 6 fire dispatchers to assist with managing the emergency communication needs.

The air quality, relating to smoke, was particularly bad in and around Clackamas County. Due to air vents being open, as

a COVID preventative measure to increase external airflow, the smoke inside C-COM was actively causing allergy reactions among employees.

About 1200 hours, C-COM learned that a Level 2 Evacuation may be ordered for Oregon City. C-COM Leadership recognized that a Level 3 Evacuation presumed an evacuation timeframe of less than 90 minutes, which would be impossible for most communication centers.


Around this same time, Clackamas County announced that county employees would be eligible for 80 hours of leave due to the wildfires. This resulted in immediate concern for C-COM's operational stability should employees take advantage of this leave.

Fortunately, this risk scenario never actualized as employees both cancelled vacation and returned from on-going leave to assist the department earlier than initially forecast.

At 1330 hours on September 10th, the Level 2 Evacuation was ordered for Oregon City.

At 1336, C-COM made the decision to evacuate 9-1-1 call-taking to LOCOM by 1500 hours on this same day.

At 1356, C-COM was asked to broadcast a "Tactical Pause" message on all radio channels, which ordered all fire-fighting activities to stop and evacuate to Personnel Accountability Reporting (PAR) locations. The Tactical Pause may be heard on YouTube at this weblink: <https://youtu.be/ivf91jK9IYE>.



WCCCA's Director, Kelly Dutra, contacted Director Bledsoe, following notification of 911 partners, to offer 9 workstations at their facility to site our dispatch services. C-COM Leadership wasn't sure how long it would take to evacuate their center. The goal set was to move dispatching services to WCCCA by 2100 hours, unsure of whether that would be possible.

The Evacuation

Tony Collins headed to C-COM to serve as the on-site Evacuation Lead to begin the process of exiting the facility. Mike Fletcher, Director at Columbia 9-1-1, contacted Director Bledsoe to offer help and he was sent to C-COM to assist Tony Collins.

Lead Dispatcher, Justin Meyers, headed to WCCCA in order to get the lay of the land at their facility and to serve as a check-in point for C-COM employees.

Employees were notified via an employee Facebook Group that C-COM would be evacuating. Some employees were sent to LOCOM/WCCCA to start their shifts there. Other employees finished out this day's shift at C-COM, while some were sent to LOCOM/WCCCA mid-shift.

Hotel rooms were coordinated for employees who were serving at the WCCCA facility; while an RV was acquired via rental to provide some on-site sleeping quarters for employees at LOCOM. LOCOM also allowed C-COM to use some sleeping rooms inside their facility for employees.

AFSCME Representative, Ross Kiely, also showed up at C-COM with a pallet of Home Depot boxes to assist with the on-site evacuation.


Clackamas Facilities also arrived on-site to assist with transportation and storage for items that we needed to clear from the building. Decisions had to be made about what would be taken to LOCOM, WCCCA, and off-site storage. Additionally, a decision was made to move Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) from the main production servers to the disaster recovery servers, over at WCCCA.

During this day, at a county level, rumors spawned that BLM/Antifa was responsible for setting wildfires in Clackamas County. These rumors gained media traction after several videos surfaced with comments made by uniformed Clackamas County Sheriff Deputies. The airing of these videos resulted in a high number of Suspicious Vehicle and Suspicious Person complaints being called in to C-COM. Additionally, rumors of militia check-points throughout the county and



reports of shootings delayed the movement of police dispatch to WCCCA to ensure the safety of responders during that transition.

This activity also resulted in a recommendation for law enforcement escort for the evacuation to WCCCA. C-COM Technicians were provided an escort to ensure their safety and prompt transport to Hillsboro, as local roads were particularly impacted by community evacuation traffic.



9-1-1 partners, throughout the state of Oregon, were notified by Director Bledsoe of C-COM's evacuation. Additionally, notification was also sent to the C-COM Member Board.

After the C-COM facility was completely evacuated, C-COM shared the information to their public community Facebook page.

In total, the physical evacuation of C-COM took approximately 7 hours. Movement of CAD to the disaster recovery servers took an additional 7 hours and was completed by 0400 hours.

Of note, as the physical and technical evacuation of C-COM was in its final stages, Tony Collins walked through the center and picked out one special item for each staff member including pictures, a guitar, purses, and personal art. This kind attention to detail was described by several team members with emotion.

THE LOGISTICS


The move from C-COM to LOCOM and WCCCA was exceptionally smooth. Common and shared technologies (including CAD, phone and radio systems) facilitated this transition. The C-COM, MAJCS and Clackamas County Tech Services demonstrated serious professionalism under pressure. Since modern emergency communications centers are high-tech organizations, nearly all of the mission critical responsibility during an evacuation rests on the Tech Team. They functioned flawlessly.

The physical part of the move was accomplished in surprisingly short order. While the time between being fully operational at C-COM and then fully operational at LOCOM and WCCCA should have realistically taken nearly 24 hours, C-COM accomplished it in less than 10, with some crucial operations up and running within mere minutes as LOCOM was able to take initial calls after the "Make Busy Switch" was triggered. The move was textbook. Nearly every employee interviewed, when asked what they thought was easier than expected, mentioned the move itself.

The host agencies, LOCOM and WCCCA, made the transition and the subsequent days of work, much easier than anyone expected. Both organizations welcomed C-COM employees with open arms, going well above and beyond expectations to make their work easier. And, as



the days wore on, the welcome never wore out. These two agencies are to be commended for their exceptional service and support for C-COM.



It is important to note that C-COM's evacuation plan, prior to these events, presumed only that services would move to Lake Oswego in 2-3 positions. These wildfires highlighted the need to expand evacuation assumptions to include scenarios in which staffing has already surged to accommodate the community-level response. While C-COM and WCCCA had been partners on the regional CAD system, neither agency had pre-planned an evacuation in either direction.

Meg Neece stood out in the emails, interviews, and survey responses as a very high performer during the events leading up to, during, and following the evacuation of the center. The logistics involved in moving the operations of an emergency communications center are complex and intertwined. Emergency Communications professionals are skilled at contending with significant challenges.

Having someone on the C-COM Team who managed the countless logistical steps so that everything from bedding to Band-Aids appeared when needed, even before they were needed, removed a significant burden from those on and off shifts. Meg worked tirelessly and unselfishly to ensure those details were taken care of and is to be commended.



C-COM employees facing evacuation from their homes while working shifts found support in the Supervisory Team, and from the Leadership Team so that they were able to deal with family needs, animals, and securing important personal possessions including firearms and vehicles. Hotel accommodations were secured and seamlessly executed. RV parking and an RV for down-time was secured.

See the Recognition Section for more details.


TECHNICAL CHALLENGES

The MAJCS Technical Team and Clackamas Tech Services encountered a number of complex technical issues that had to be resolved during this evacuation period. The MAJCS Technical Team conducted their own internal debriefing of this evacuation process and the technical challenges. The following technical challenges were identified with the following remedies:

- 9/8/20: Network Disruption, due to fire at Clackamette Park
 - Remedies identified, include:
 - Talking to CBX to identify another link.
 - Router ports at C-COM became filled: TS found another one to replace the existing one with ore ports.
 - Columbia 911 is working on a redundant connection to C-COM
 - LOCOM is working on connection with WCCCA.

- 9/10/20: Rolling Phones, when C-COM moved to LOCOM, some phone lines rolled, but others were not due to split responsibilities.
 - Issues identified:
 - Noble 9-1-1 brought our 5 extra VESTA work stations and the 2 command posts at C-COM were moved to LOCOM.
 - Rolling back to C-COM was challenging
 - Couldn't have IRR on positions.
 - There was no sound on the extra phones for 9-1-1 calls that C-COM was using
 - Remedies identified, include:
 - Should forward numbers to cell phones or other phones where they should go.
 - VESTA software should be the same version on all machines, if possible.
 - New logging recorder system should have IP-based IRR available to call-takers, along with IP-based recording.
 - Should post information about how to log into positions.

- 9/10 to 9/11/20: Moving CAD to Disaster Recovery Servers,
 - Issues identified:
 - Took 10 minutes to roll CAD over to DR servers, but 2 hours for TTMS and Field Ops,
 - Every desktop had to pull down a file larger than 5 gig which took Columbia 911 about 30 minutes to download DR CAD through 100 MB line.



- TTMS SQL problem, turned out to be a Windows issue, but CAD vendor assumed this was a CAD issue.
 - Constrained by hardware and storage performance which slowed down during failover times.
 - Remedies identified, include:
 - Clackamas TS and MAJCS Techs should share screens when possible during events so everyone can have eyes on issues,
 - Real time asynchronous replication between all the machines,
 - Some kind of automating of the DR system without as much manual manipulation. Manual intervention took a lot of time and was fraught with potential for errors. PDQ deploy or scripts could be set up in advance.
 - Critical SOP or SOG for this process should be documented and ensure access for all tech employees.
 - Data reproduced. ARCSERV was not running and not replicating. Needs to be backed up to another location.
- 9/13/20: CAD CRASH #1
 - Issues identified:
 - ProQA wasn't dumping notes into comments
 - SQL storage folder was full which slowed system down and it stopped responding.
 - No early notification that this was coming. On production server, likely Techs would have been notified.
 - Remedies identified, include:
 - CAD vendor "jobs" should be set up on the Disaster Recovery hard drives,
 - Alerting should be set up on disk utilization, space & capacity,
 - Install VEEAM client to ensure backups are done properly,
 - May need to add more space than in production.
- 9/19/20: CAD Down at LOCOM
 - Issues identified:
 - CAD could not be used, switch was unplugged from the main cable to the Call-taking room.
 - Remedies identified, include:
 - Have one GB switch in the backroom and aim not to daisy chain switches,
 - Lay in wires into the wall at LOCOM new building. C-COM could wire EOC for phone/CAD for ease of set-up.
- 9/20/20: CAD CRASH #2
 - Issues identified:
 - CAD functions not updating. Calls could not be set up for dispatch.

- Remedies identified, include:
 - Notification process for TS took longer than notifying Julio directly. Recommend TS documentation of common procedures so anyone getting the call can do the work up front.
- 9/22/20: Rolling CAD back into Production from the Disaster Recovery Servers
 - Issues identified:
 - Manual intervention, see other DR event for recommendations
 - Forgot to start ARCSERV when we had to restart CAD With full server
- Through Duration of the Event: GIS layers imported into CAD with frequent changes
 - Issues identified:
 - OEM had an evacuation layer in addition to Clackamas.
 - Remedies identified, include:
 - Confirm notification process with main GIS for these types of events,
 - Ensure access for MAJCS staff to all GIS data that is needed.

THE PARTNERS

City of Lake Oswego / LOCOM: LOCOM team members worked while under heavy call volumes themselves in addition to providing a welcoming and professional environment for C-COM Call Takers and Supervisors. Several people reported that LOCOM Team members checked in with C-COM staff multiple times throughout the shifts to provide support in small and large ways. Doing so for a day or two is common but the support continued throughout the entire time C-COM staff was in LOCOM's space. That is to be commended.

The City of Lake Oswego also closed the City offices initially in order to provide thoughtful consideration to navigate increased COVID risks and to allow C-COM employees to settle into their facility. Lake Oswego also provided their conference room and employee kitchen space for C-COM operational set-up. C-COM employees were also able to work on the LOCOM operations floor, at times, when work stations were available. In addition to respite areas, these areas were particularly helpful to C-COM. Beyond the physical space, LOCOM's lead employees also provided assistance to C-COM when they were unable to have a supervisor on-site. All of this support was identified to be helpful.

Washington County Consolidated Communications Agency (WCCCA): WCCCA team members provided the same kind of professional support for C-COM Dispatchers and Supervisors. Technical interoperability made the transition to Dispatching from their center seamless. And while such operational effectiveness was the result of years of cooperation



between agencies in the region, the difficulty of the human side of co-locating in a fully functional communications center cannot be underestimated. WCCCA did everything necessary, going above and beyond, to ensure the smooth and seamless integration of the C-COM Team into their facility and workflow. This has rarely been seen, especially when the two organizations needed to share space for an extended time.



From sharing restrooms to conference rooms, kitchen space to supplies, WCCCA made an exceptionally difficult situation as pleasant as possible. In the final week of the evacuation, WCCCA made a special effort to include C-COM employees into their Telecommunicator Appreciation Week activities, which had been delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. They are to be commended.

Noble 9-1-1: Since February 2019, C-COM has been without a phone maintenance contract for its 9-1-1- telephone system, as the procurement process to get this contract in place has been extensive. The lack of such a contract puts critical telephony at risk, during a significant event such as this, because failures can be deprioritized by phone support vendors; however, Noble 9-1-1 went above and beyond to provide support to C-COM during this incident.

Noble 9-1-1 provided laptops and the capability to expand call-taking stations at LOCOM. They provided a significant amount of on-site support at both C-COM and LOCOM, relating to the evacuation and the re-entry of services back to C-COM. This effort is to be commended.

MAJCS Tech & Clackamas Tech Services Team: Technicians from within LOCOM, WCCCA, C911 and C-COM make up a 4-CAD system technical team for the Metro Area Joint CAD System (MAJCS). These technicians worked tirelessly to ensure that CAD and phones stayed functional at each of the locations. This team encountered a number of technical issues which were outlined above. Their ability to problem-solve and handle every issue without disrupting the mission-critical functions of call-taking and dispatching is to be commended.

Clackamas Facilities: Clackamas Facilities provided significant support to assist C-COM in evacuating their facility. Additionally, Facilities was involved heavily in the re-entry process to fix facility leaks that occurred while C-COM was evacuated, assisted in smoke removal with additional janitorial support, cleared out the items listed for surplus, and moved items from the storage facility back to C-COM. They completed a number of important re-entry tasks that made C-COM's re-entry easier. This is to be commended.

Oregon City Police Department: As noted earlier, the Oregon City Police Department provided a local call-center that worked 24-hours and was able to take after-hours calls when the Public Inquiry Center (PIC) was closed. This work created a notable and positive downward tipping point in the call volume managed by C-COM.

Community Donations: Throughout this event, C-COM received a number of donations which included meals for employees, beverages and replacement kitchen supplies for both LOCOM and WCCCA to compensate for use by C-COM employees. Pictured here is a donation received from Factory Wheel Outlet which was one of 2 donations provided during the duration of these events.



Offers of Support: Throughout the evacuation, C-COM received a number of offers of support both from internal Clackamas County departments, AFSCME-connected organizations and 911 agencies throughout the state of Oregon and southwest Washington. Because of its evacuated status, C-COM tracked these offers, but only requested support that could be utilized and applied to the events at hand, mindful of the reality that spontaneous donations can create their own secondary incident within an emergency.

DURING THE EVACUATION

Operational Stability

Following evacuation, C-COM Call-Takers and Dispatchers settled into navigating exceptionally high call volumes and dispatch instability.

Because of the presence of the wildfire Incident Management Team, fire dispatch was the first area of operations that became manageable upon move to WCCCA.

Law Dispatch and 9-1-1 Call-Taking remained heavy in the days following evacuation. There was an evident interest for law operations to ensure that their peers could hear their radio traffic. The law enforcement nets quickly became saturated and the workload became difficult for law dispatchers to manage. Concern grew quickly that either an officer or dispatcher may miss an officer-safety alert with the amount of traffic that was occurring on the radio nets.

Both C-COM supervisors, Ops Manager and Director were involved in numerous conversations with Law Liaisons inside the Command Post to encourage radio discipline, discontinuing special operations (like Charlie unit home visits and traffic details), and consideration of adding a 4th radio net (which never did quite materialize).

Call-Taking remained busy throughout the duration of the evacuation with at least double call volume daily. It should be noted that many of the calls received by C-COM call-takers were calls to the non-emergency lines. Call volume returned to “typical” on September 21, 2020.

Schedule Stability

Once C-COM Operations moved to LOCOM & WCCCA, C-COM initially aimed to maintain one schedule across the agency; however, this became quickly problematic for the following reasons:

- It was difficult to manage coverage needs at two location with one schedule,

- A lot of critical staffing pages were issued for schedule gaps, impacting the ability to sleep and solve schedule shortages,
- Schedule-sharing between 2 locations made last-minute changes difficult to navigate,
- Employees wanted to know when and where their next shift would occur for personal planning & family logistics.

Several actions were taken, as a result, that proved helpful. These included:

- Invocation of “emergency staffing” which resulted in double-time for operations employees and lessened the need to determine what was mandatory overtime or voluntary overtime.
- Setting everyone on 12-hour shifts, which eliminated the need to determine mandatory overtime. If the staffing level at the 10-hour mark was sufficient, employees could be sent home anytime between 10-12 hour marks which provided some predictability for their schedules and lessened the number of gap pages that needed to be sent.
- Assigning staff to LOCOM and WCCCA primarily. While some employees worked at both locations, C-COM tried to keep employees assigned to one location primarily.

Each of these decisions was reviewed between the C-COM Operations Manager and AFSCME Chapter President to ensure that both management and labor were in agreement to the changes made.


Suzanne Baughman, an experienced dispatcher and coach, worked through the duration of this incident at LOCOM as a mentor and support for C-COM call-takers. Her influence was described as steady, calming and professional. Several people reported that she stood out as one of the most helpful people during the entire wildfire event.

THE RETURN TO C-COM

The decision to return to C-COM on September 23rd was guided by several key issues:

- Operational Stability (both for dispatch and call-taking)
- Lifting of Evacuation Notices in Oregon City. Evacuation levels dropped on September 16, 2020.
- Air Quality around C-COM which remained very unhealthy through September 18, 2020.
- Facility Readiness to eliminate leaks & smoke from C-COM. This work was completed by September 21, 2020.
- Completion of the technical work to roll the CAD Servers from Disaster Recovery to CAD Production. This occurred on September 22, 2020.

C-COM Leadership, Tech Team and paused Trainees worked intensely through the coming days to prepare for re-entry into C-COM on Wednesday, September 23rd. Call-Taking was rolled back to C-COM at 1600 on the 23rd. Fire Dispatch was moved over to C-COM at 1700 hours and Law Dispatch was moved over at 1900 hours.




C-COM borrowed a trailer from the Aurora Fire Department in order to pick up evacuated items from LOCOM and WCCCA. This was appreciated.

C-COM returned to “normal operations” at 0500 on Thursday, September 24, 2020. This was also determined to be the end of “emergency staffing.”

THE IMPACT ON C-COM TEAM MEMBERS AND THEIR FAMILIES

Many C-COM Team members were impacted by notices to evacuate. Beginning on September 8th, around 1500 hours, the first C-COM employees became aware that their homes were in the path of the fires. At that time affected staff members began leaving to get family members to safety. Supervisors worked to manage workloads while people left and then returned to work with pets and cars full of valuables. Director Bledsoe gave permission to put animals inside CCOM temporarily.

The intensity of potential personal loss while managing the dramatic increase in work at C-COM was managed exceptionally well. Those interviewed described an inspiring level of professionalism demonstrated by all, but especially by those whose homes were in evacuation areas. Several evacuated their homes and families and came right back to work at C-COM.



Fire near evacuated employee's home. Vehicle was not moving at the time this

The intensity of the schedule through September 24th was apparent but no one reported a drop in quality of work.

THE TEAM

The C-COM Team has worked to create and protect a healthy culture, as mentioned above. This hard work has paid off. An organization as complex as C-COM is actually made up of several teams working in concert to deliver services. The Supervisory Team, Dispatcher and Call-Taking Teams, Technical Team, Leadership Team, Coaches and Trainers, Labor Leaders, Peer Support Team all worked seamlessly to provide the highest volume of services, under difficult circumstances. Communication between Teams, from the Director, between Supervisors, between shifts was exceptional. Within hours of standing up services at LOCOM and WCCCA, a rhythm of work was achieved. The residents of Clackamas County were never left without 9-1-1 and Emergency Dispatch services.

Decisions and organization changes over the past several years contributed to the success of this team. Some of the actions credited include:

- **Separating Call-Takers and Dispatch Workload:** Prior to 2018, C-COM Dispatchers served both in the role of call-taker and dispatcher. The level of multi-tasking required to answer phones and cover radio traffic was determined to place a workload pressure that resulted in a level of service to user agencies that was deemed unacceptable. As a result, C-COM created a call-taking classification and is now using this classification as the entry-level point into the organization.

At the time of this incident, the presence of separate call-takers allowed services to be split quickly into 2 locations with clear understanding of who would be working at LOCOM and who may be working at WCCCA. If this workload had not been previously separated, a 2-site evacuation would have become much more complex to achieve from a schedule assignment perspective.

- **Improved Labor / Management Relationship:** C-COM has historically experienced difficult labor-management relations, based both low staffing and a history of three schedule-related contract arbitrations. With both the leadership change in 2018 and an AFSCME leadership change in 2019, both labor and management have worked to improve communications.

This effort to improve relationships and communications was credited with improving workplace morale which allowed both sides to express concerns or have issues addressed quickly to both the benefit of operational stability and employee health/safety. Had these relationships not been improved, evacuation may have become much more difficult.

- **Remote Technology Research and Development:** Earlier in 2020, the influence of the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a decision to research how to take call-taking and dispatching off-site in a remote capacity. C-COM had learned that Fairfax, Virginia, had successfully worked through the issues necessary to move these services off-site. C-COM immediately took action to connect with the Tech Manager in Virginia to learn more about how this was possible. Between March and the wildfires, C-COM began testing technologies that would make this remote capability possible.

This work effort directly affected the ability to set up call-taking stations at LOCOM and the ability to tap into local resources at WCCCA. While evacuation was not even under consideration when this research began, it became instrumental in the smooth movement of services to both LOCOM and WCCCA.

- **Regional Technical Partnerships & Relationships:** For many years, C-COM has had strong relationships with its regional 9-1-1 partners throughout the Portland metro area. C-COM has intergovernmental agreements via MAJCS to share CAD technology with LOCOM, WCCCA and Columbia 911 and with the Portland Dispatch Center Consortium to share CAD2CAD information sharing throughout the entire Portland area and into Southwest Washington. These regional partners have worked together for many years to advance cutting-edge technologies like Text-to-911 and the ability for every CAD system to share information seamlessly with each other.

These relationships and partnership to share similar technologies were vital to the smooth evacuation to both LOCOM and WCCCA. These relationships resulted in the quick develop of staff sharing agreement and the ability to evacuate to 2 locations, even though the 2nd location was never presumed within C-COM's evacuation plan.

- **Regular Communications:** The final workplace pre-event change, credited with why this transition was so smooth was the regular communications provided to C-COM employees. Since the 2018 leadership change, C-COM's Director has communicated with employees weekly about issues facing the department. This regular communications has increased, at times, due to the nature of the emergency situation being handled. For example, during the early days of the pandemic, Director Bledsoe communicated workplace changes daily. Similarly, during the wildfire, employees received a daily communication about what to expect. This messaging continued to be important to provide a stable source of information in a very dynamic situation.

It should be noted that upon evacuation, C-COM employees lost the ability to connect with their county email. However, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, employees created a private Facebook Group, called "Attention C-COM Shoppers" to allow employees to share needs and be able to minimize their community exposures. The daily updates were share to both the Facebook group and employee's personal emails throughout the duration of this incident.

THE LEADERSHIP

Leadership matters. While it is not everything, it is the first thing. As the Leadership Team goes, so goes the organization. Director Bledsoe, Tony Collins, Toni Sexton, and Meg Neece have built excellent working relationships, communicating well under pressure. Their foresight enabled them to spring into action early.

Director Bledsoe's habit of communicating openly and regularly during the COVID-19 pandemic response set the stage for excellent and regular communication throughout this evacuation event. Her 360-degree communication style was described by those interviewed as the best they have ever experienced in a work setting.

The decision to evacuate the center was a difficult one, but it was also the correct decision.

The Supervisory Team stepped up and provided consistent direction and leadership throughout the events. They relied on each other, on other experienced members of the staff, and added value at every turn. Even their newest member, Ben Postlewait demonstrated seasoned, selfless and wise leadership.

Communication Centers do not often have vital and healthy Supervisory Teams and everyone struggles as a result. This is not the case with C-COM. Supervisory Teams are the "keepers of the culture" in every organization. The workplace culture (described as "how it really works around here") is a direct result of the model set by Supervisors. C-COM Supervisors performed exceptionally well during this event.

The Labor/Management Team additionally functioned like a Team, rather than as two opposing Teams. Their ability to address work and schedule issues, not envisioned in the contracts, in such a way as to serve residents during this crisis while caring for the staff was unparalleled. Creativity, openness, flexibility ruled the day. This relationship was tested and emerged stronger.

THE AFTERMATH

Understandably, most returned to C-COM exhausted to face another round of COVID-19 complexities. The staffing at C-COM has suffered due to the pandemic and much-needed celebrations, accolades and refreshment have yet to be scheduled, beyond initial peer debriefings set up to provide an opportunity to deal with personal impacts.

Many of the seasoned members of the C-COM Teams proudly reflected in interviews a few weeks following the events upon the performance of the center. Most reported that, apart from the long hours, the core work itself, while of a significantly higher volume than ever experienced, was easier than they would have thought. They also reported that technology (mostly) worked better than they thought it would and that working from LOCOM and WCCCA was smoother than expected.



While an event exactly like this one may likely never happen again, C-COM will be called on to perform outside of the norm due to the convergence of unforeseen circumstances. And this event proved that the organization is sound.

OPERATIONAL FINDINGS

Notification Process Needs Reconsideration for High Volume, Evacuation Events



The events of this incident produced a number of emergency notifications. During the early hours of this event, many of the evacuation messages were short burst, "get out" style without geographic specificity about areas impacted or where residents of the county should evacuate to. This dramatically increased call volume from residents asking questions to clarify the messages to ensure they were within the evacuation zones and where to evacuate to.

Overlapping map notification areas resulted in confusing messages for the residents. Some reported receiving multiple evacuation notices from the alerts that were sent out. This also increased incoming call volume.

The county website was not regularly updated during the first 2 days following this event during the time when the bulk of the evacuation messages were sent to the public. This resulted in the public having no alternate resource to confirm evacuation messages to calling 9-1-1.

Operational pressures inside C-COM as the wildfires broke out, following the windstorm, created an untenable and unsustainable situation for C-COM supervisors who had to choose between providing community notifications and providing assistance to operations employees. This meant C-COM had to double the supervisory staff, an unsustainable solution for more than a shift or two.

Map updates, even after a GIS person was assigned, were slow at crucial times, resulting in up to 90-minute delays in delivering evacuation messaging to the public. This created increased danger and liability from the time an Incident Commander requested an emergency message to its delivery to the public.

Lack of existing plan for events of this nature resulted in development of new processes on the fly, during this incident. For the future, plans should be developed in advance and include a Public Information Officer, GIS map expert and Fire Liaison who can ensure that CCOM is notified in advance of new notification and who can ensure that the PIC stays informed and up to date with key talking points.

Once the EOC was providing notification, C-COM received inconsistent notice regarding when new messages were delivered. While these occurred less frequently after the first 72 hours, C-COM had to be proactive, confirming information rather than having it delivered to them as a matter of form.

Public Inquiry Center Needs Consistent Hours & Credible Information to Be Effective



Throughout this incident, the PIC did not have a clear or predictable schedule for providing service to the community. While there had been a PIC established for COVID-19, there appeared to be some difficulty in transitioning this line to address the needs of the wildfire and subsequent evacuation needs.

Once staffed, the PIC closed unpredictably, at times, throughout the incident, regardless of call volume levels being seen inside C-COM. These sudden closures resulted in additional call surges into the 9-1-1 center when people were unable to reach the PIC.

Volunteers inside the PIC did not appear to have clear knowledge of incident response recommendations and regularly referred callers back to C-COM. This resulted in circular routes for callers, increasing their frustration with being unable to obtain accurate information about the evacuation routes and wildfire response.

There was little connection to the evacuation notice process for the PIC when it was open. This meant that PIC information was often outdated or unknown, resulting in more redirection back to C-COM.

Oregon City Police Department opened a city-level Public Inquiry Center. While this was open in hours where the Clackamas PIC was not open and was a welcome and accessible information point, the existence of multiple PICs likely resulted in additional confusion for the public and C-COM staff.

Incident Command System Clarity Was Needed

While emergency management systems were already functioning in response to the pandemic, there was an initial fog of confusion over several basic incident command structures.

Location of the incident command post & wildfire EOC, presence of multiple coordination points for police and fire resulted in confusion over who C-COM should be coordinating with for police & fire support. For several days during the crisis, C-COM had to make multiple phone calls to determine who was serving in law/fire liaison positions and who had the authority to make discipline-specific operational changes. This resulted in notable delays in decision-making.

Lack of a communication plan and briefing schedule hindered C-COM's ability to visualize the existing county response, once evacuated to LOCOM/WCCCA resulting in use of valuable time tracking down authorities who could assist in sharing vital officer safety information about the volume of traffic on the radio nets. While no specific incidents of error have been identified, this could have resulted in significant threats to safety and increased liability to C-COM.

RECOGNITION OF OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE AT C-COM

The most difficult portion of any Operational Review is the commendation section. The reason C-COM performed so well over such a long period of time under relentless pressure was that every member of the C-COM Team, to an individual, performed at his or her best, unwaveringly, for twenty days. Several people reported that they were less stressed when at work than when at home wondering how their Team members were fairing.

To identify the following people is, in some ways unrepresentative of the whole. However, when asked what and who stood out consistently through the days of this Wildfire event, nearly everyone interviewed or surveyed said the following people were “rock stars.”

Of note: when these people were asked, none of them mentioned themselves.

Suz Baughman	Scott Miller
Ben Postlewait	Jodi Edmeier
Tony Collins	Jeremy Hipes
Toni Sexton	Katie Alexander
Cheryl Bledsoe	Tina Burgess
Meg Neece	Angie Peterson
Fred Yungbluth	Teresa Raihala-Sethe
Bill Conway	Justin Meyers
Michael Smith	

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations for the Near Term

1. Critical Incident Debriefing for C-COM employees that focuses on celebration of a job well done and identifies lessons learned for individual readiness and resilience.
2. Update the C-COM Continuity Plan’s evacuation chapter, incorporating lessons learned, to be updated yearly, which assumes high-volume incidents and multi-site evacuation.
3. Conversely, prepare C-COM to receive partner agencies, should a similar scenario result for WCCCA, LOCOM or C911.
4. Develop an off-the-shelf emergency schedule, developed from this incident, and add assumptions to the labor contract to ensure ease of implementation for the future.
5. Store Protocols, SOPs, and miscellaneous resources, now kept in files or in the intranet at C-COM, on the cloud, so they can be accessed more easily in times of crisis.

6. Highlight one story per month of someone who went above and beyond the call of duty during these events and communicate it with the C-COM Teams.
7. Create structured communication habit in which the County meets with the Member Board to develop strong working relationships that will serve the department well in times of crisis. In times of intense crisis, these relationships may help to provide additional bandwidth for the director.
8. Clarify Fire and Law Liaison assignments to C-COM. Ensure that connectivity to C-COM is established early so that the “fog of war” confusion is minimized in future events.

Recommendations for the Long-Term

C-COM Operational Changes

1. Acquire C-COM go-van or trailer and equip with essential supplies, important for a future evacuation. This includes intentional organization efforts inside C-COM to ensure that a future evacuation could be activated more intentionally and smoothly.
2. Accelerate investment in “Remote Dispatch/Call-Taking” to assist in pandemic staffing, to work out the bugs in such an approach, and to help with expert staff retention. Goal: 4-6 complete Remote Kits.
3. Develop a “lessons learned” list for labor contracts to be incorporated in future contracts, specifically include conditions surrounding high-profile, emergency events. Include early move to 12-hour shifts.
4. Develop operational triage protocols for disaster response situation and call-holding for peak times presuming that there may be an incident in which there simply isn’t enough staff to handle the incoming call volumes.
5. Consider development of regular part-time positions or creation of a list of previous C-COM employees who left or retired in good standing who may be capable of serving as back-up call-takers, dispatchers or PIC personnel. Part-time positions would allow maintenance of basic 911 skills that could be surged temporarily to full-time work in times of crisis. A list of retirees, serving in the PIC as a Voluntary Reserve Team would be helpful as they would have understanding of 911 operations and the importance of this work.
6. Create pre-event contracts for catering. During this event, locating food initially was problematic for evening shifts, due to the pandemic and the fact that many restaurants had closed early. Pre-existing contracts can assist in locating food on short-notice for emergency events.
7. Create a secure location for C-COM employee valuables in the event of evacuation from homes or from the center.

Multi-Agency Planning Improvements

1. Formalize a long-term Back-up Center plan including a two-site version of plan for C-COM and a regional version, providing assumptions for regional partners. Working together on a back-up center could result in cost-sharing that may be beneficial for all agencies who participate.
2. Address Community Notification Program, particularly as it relates to dynamic, fast-moving incidents. It is recommended that this responsibility not be seated inside C-COM, due to its need to maintain supervisory support to the Operations Floor. Ideally, this responsibility should be located at a 24-hour desk inside the Sheriff's Office, who typically is responsible for evacuation inside emergency management plans, with the ability to trigger a team that includes a fire liaison for events such as these, a GIS specialist who can produce maps as needed and a Public Information Officer who is sharing information with the PIC.
3. Address deficiencies in the workflow between Disaster Management and C-COM by clarifying expectations regarding Incident Command Structure, inclusion of C-COM into information flow and service needs of the Public Inquiry Center.
4. Encourage a well-staffed Public Information Center. Consider immediate assignment of C-COM trainees to the PIC during times of emergency.
5. Recommend and advocate for the use of a combined EOC with both fire/law liaisons present, regardless of the intensity of the event. Multiple Incident Command Posts or EOCs meeting separately can make the work much harder than it needs to be.

CONCLUSION

The events caused by, and surrounding, the wildfires of the fall of 2020 in Western and Northwestern Oregon will be studied for years. Western public safety agencies have a long tradition of innovation, adapting wide swaths of their approaches and systems in the aftermath of significant events and this will undoubtedly be true of these wildfires.

As the hub of emergency communications, C-COM performed exceptionally well at every level while under pressure rarely experienced by communications centers. The center's ability to adapt to dramatic increases in call volume and dispatched events, to surge staffing in response to absent or sporadic public information sources and systems, and to evacuate to two different locations with minimal downtime, while in the middle of a global pandemic is simply unheard of.

The decision to evacuate to LOCOM and WCCCA was the correct one. Building on the years of work to regionalize technology and create redundant systems, C-COM was able to move all essential work from the center in Oregon City, OR, to LOCOM and WCCCA, achieving operational stability in hours rather than days.

The C-COM Leadership Teams, of both managers and supervisors, led a vital workplace culture through over two weeks of unrelenting intensity, all the while providing service to the community that some called "stellar."

This After-Action Review found these five main themes:

1. Strong leadership teams made excellent and decisive decisions and communicated very well before, during and after the wildfires.
2. C-COM staff members, to an individual, performed at the highest levels the authors of this study have ever seen, especially given their weary state leading up to the wildfires due to coping with the COVID-19 pandemic response.
3. The C-COM workplace culture made difficult challenges easier than anyone thought they could be. People stepped up and tirelessly supported one another at work and away from work in creative and poignant ways.
4. Coordination, at least from a communication structure point of view, with multiple coordination points made the work more complicated than it needed to be. A simple ICS approach to the wildfires could have significantly decreased workload on C-COM and increased its ability to provide timely, correct and valuable information to residents.
5. Regarding communication, notification and interoperability, these events exposed the need for emergency management plans to better understand the pivotal role that 9-1-1 plays in every crisis event. Assumptions of 9-1-1 must be incorporated into emergency plans so that operational stability can be maintained.

The C-COM Teams are to be commended for their management of one of the most complex and challenging situations faced by any emergency communications center.

SOURCES

Individual experiences of C-COM employees reported via telephone interviews
Individual experiences of Public Safety Partners reported via telephone interviews
Group and Team Experiences reported in email, text messages and via interviews
C-COM Employee Survey Responses
Documentation internal to C-COM
Email threads from key influencers
Reports generated during and after the Wildfire events by C-COM staff
Social Media accounts
Local, Regional and National Press
Internal documents from partner agencies
After Action Reviews from other agencies
APCO International databases
SCGI 9-1-1 Center Database

APPENDICES

A Expanded and Detailed Timeline

B After Action Employee Survey Questions

**C C-COM Budget Impacts Documents
Expenses Incurred**

**D Evacuation Plan Documentation: Back-up Center
Continuity Plan with Evacuation Chapter**

E. Tactical Pause Script

F. Surge Call Volume Graphics and Data

Appendix A--Expanded and Detailed Timeline

Timeline of Events

C-COM Wildfire After-Action Report

(Edited 12/20/2020 for brevity and flow)

Time action taken in 24-hour military time or at the beginning of a line.

Saturday, September 5th

- Emergency Management Actions
 - Email (1903): NB to County EMT re: PGE Possible Public Safety Power Shut Off & Weather Alert
 - CB Actions:
 - Text to AC / TS with heads up regarding Sunday coordination call.
 - County EMT Email forwarded (2010) to AC / TS
 - County EMT Email forwarded (2014) to JHa / RP for C800 notification
-

Sunday, September 6th

- PGE Briefing (1100): CB / TC / TS participated in this briefing. Led by PGE. Weather event planned for 2000 hours Monday through 1300 Tuesday. Winds estimated at 25 mph, Gusts 40-50 mph, strongest gusts to be in high terrain. High risk for fire with high winds, high temps.
- PGE Plan =
 - De-energize the power grid on Mt. Hood at 2000 hours on Monday, 9/7/20. Re-energize as soon as is safe. Estimate for re-energization on Wednesday. Will take 48 hours to re-energize power grid.
 - Later today = Level 3 warning & decision to be made about de-energizing grid
 - At 1800 hours, estimate 1st community notification for the area regarding de-energization. Already begun social media conversation.
 - PGE IMT was activated at 1800 hours yesterday
 - Monday, PGE will have field observers in field to affirm weather conditions
- CB Questions:
 - # of people in the outreach area? 2400 phone lines.
 - Referral line / Caller ID? Will go to PGE Call Center

- Can CCOM be notified early of decision to de-energize grid? Yes
- AC Questions: Alternate way to reach PGE? Yes, Info provided
- Follow-Up Actions:
 - CB / TC / TS = Zoom meeting to discuss follow-up needed from the PGE
 - 1141: CB Email to JP requesting map of notification area. Confirmed 2794 phone numbers in notification area. CB forwarded map to AC/TS
 - 1203: CB Email to Chief Jim Davis as Fire Defense Board Liaison with following 2 requests
 - FDB identify call prioritization preferences for tomorrow's windstorm.
 - Request FDB to send a liaison to CCOM to assist with call prioritization on Monday night.
 - 1205: CB email to JP requesting schedule of anticipated alert times to ensure CCOM staffing could be surged properly.
 - 1224: CB email to all C-COM employees & E-Board entitled "INCIDENT NOTICE: PGE Public Safety Power Shutoff"
 - 1302: NB confirmed she was not handling FDB requests.
 - 1958: Chief Charlton email concurring with JD and referring any ops issues/liaison needs to BC303
 - 2011: JD email to confirm that BC360 also avail from Canby Fire.

Monday, September 7th

- 1100: PGE Coordination Call
 - Weather Outlook: Highest winds in many years. Gusts start at 1200 hours today. Expected wind speeds of 25-40 mph initially. By 1900-2000, winds to 35-50 mph, 55-65 in gorge, 75+ in hills, 50-60 mph in Mt Hood Corridor. Winds increasing overnight, particularly at midnight. At 0700 on 9/8/20, expect winds to increase by another 5 mph, should weaken after 0800-1700. Post 1700, winds should decrease substantially.
 - Damage estimate: expect many down power lines, lots of dead limbs & trees
 - Decision to be made by 1500 today on whether to shut off power grid.
 - Planning a community resource center at the elementary school in Welches.
 - PGE Resources:
 - Grid Operations Organizational work: 10 tree trimming crews, 15 single-man crews, 10 additional crews will be responding
 - Call Center will be staffed today through outage
 - Community resource center will be staffed 0900-1900, starting Tuesday to provide customers with water, snacks, chargers, generators.
 - PGE IMT remains active.

- 1224: CB Update email to employees and E-Board “Monday Update: PGE Public Safety Power Shutoff”
 - 1447: AC email to Ted Willard (BC303) regarding serving as fire liaison at CCOM with MDC. FOC activated for 1700 hours
 - 1500: PGE confirms decision to turn off power grid at sometime between 1900-2000 hours tonight (power grid ended up going down around 1900 hours)
 - 1700: FOC Activated with BC303 serving as fire liaison inside CCOM
 - STORM BEGINS
 - 1900-ish: Power grid shut off in the Mt Hood Corridor area
 - 2000-ish TECH FAILURE: Clackamas Park Fire, burned fiber line between CCSO North Station & CCOM. Impacts = MDC/MDT outage, US Digital Fire Station Alerting stopped working
 - Community Notifications begin
-

Tuesday, September 8th

- Community Notifications Continue
- 0800: CCOM Mgt Team Meeting via Zoom
- 0826: CCSO Desk notifies us that their phones aren't fully functional. If can't get through to desk, advised by Mary Lindgren to use cell phones for records employees.
- 0922: CB email regarding call volume & stats to all employees / E-Board
- 1020: County declares emergency for wildfires
 - Four OERS numbers for these fires
 - Oregon City / Redland Road Fire (15 homes evacuated)
 - Colton: Unger Fire (28 evacuations)
 - Wilhoit Bird Fire (125 acres, not contained. Aircraft, dozers coming)
 - Beachie Creek Fire (merging with Lionhead Fire)
 - Fires not contained
 - Hwy 211 / Dhoogie Road Fire = new
 - Macksburg Fire / Lumber Mill
 - Oregon State Fire Marshall has NO RESOURCES due to 4 other major conflagrations in the state.

- Right now: Gresham, TVFR, all Clackamas agencies, ODF are fighting our fires
- No injuries or loss of life so far
- Working with AMR / Law Enforcement to prioritize life safety incidents
- Challenges in Washington County (Pete's Mountain Fire, Haag Lake Fire)
- Marion County also significantly affected

- 1100: PGE Coordination Call
 - Experienced a "Diablo Santa Ana events" which happens only 1-2x per century.
 - Wind speed was 55 mph sustained. 6 transmission poles lost in Sandy.
 - 75K customers without power still (100K customers at peak without power)
 - Downed wires everywhere
 - Weather: still windy, getting gradually better. May improve at 2000 hours tonight. Humidity 10-20%,
 - Still significant fire threat through Thursday
 - Beachie Fire grew by 10 miles into Santiam Canyon. Fire speed "significant"
 - BPA lost transmission lines. Silverton under evacuation.
 - Mt Hood Corridor damage assessment still underway. Still wind in area. 21 contract crews working with PGE.
 - Resource Center will stay intact until power restored.

- 1130: Post PGE Call Zoom with CCOM Mgt Team (CB, TS, TC, MN)
 - Key concerns included number of community notifications. Supervisors are getting pounded. How do we get this out of the Ops Floor? (Decided to have Bill Conway & Jeremy work exclusively on these notices at this time)
 - Katee (trainee) doing awesome job remembering calls.
 - Using Ops 23 from LOCOM.
 - MDC outage for 2 hours before CCOM notified because Fire users were using Intterra instead for situational awareness

- 1222: CB email to NB re: Public Inquiry Center. Calls into 9-1-1 without sufficient info to answer. Ask if these calls should be referred to PIC for COVID or if there will be 2nd PIC.

- 1500: First CCOM employees within evacuation area. Staff begin leaving to get family members to safety.

- 1600: ESF 2 call with State ESF 2 Coordination
 - 34 fires in state currently
 - Largest in Lane County. 2nd largest = Beachie Creek Fire in Stayton area
 - State Radio / ODOT
 - Radio site burned in Lane County yesterday

- Halls Ridge Tower Site, Crown Castle, AT&T sites being watched closely.
 - ODF resources currently deployed to Klamath Fire & Holliday Farm in Springfield
 - 1728: CB Email to all employees about Evacuation Hotel Vouchers with American Red Cross. MN begins coordinating for staff in affected evacuation areas.
 - 1800-ish: CB call to GS, asking for permission to craft an agreement with LOCOM and C9-1-1 for supplemental staffing because current staffing plan is unsustainable.
-

Wednesday, September 9th

- 0659: CB email to all employees and E-Board regarding Tuesday statistics which were 5x the amount of volumes for a normal day. Messaged staff to reach out for help due to uncertain nature of all being dealt with personally & professionally.
- 0738: CB email to E-Board and Administrator Schmidt: Informed regarding increasing fire dispatchers to 6 (normal = 2), Law Dispatchers to 3, plus 3 call-takers and 2 supervisors. ALL CONSOLES IN USE (likely from Monday night during storm surge). Also informed E-Board of request for surge staffing agreement with C9-1-1 and LOCOM due to need to supplement staff by coming weekend if call surge continued at present rates.
- 0752: CB email to SS / MF with formal request for staff-sharing. Asked for any agreements any have used previously. Determined all employees would be paid by home agency and CCOM would reimburse.
- 0912: CB email to EOC Command with several requests
 - Incident Command Structure / who is in charge
 - Briefing schedule for 9/9/20 (Said “we are lacking information”)
 - Evacuation messaging: We cannot continue to have our supervisors engaged & manage dispatch operations.
 - Requested Bill Conway be detached from COVID EOC (later denied by Philip Mason-Joyner due to Philip & Bill being ONLY COVID staff)
 - PIC Coverage: requested expansion of PIC to 24/7 until evacuations slow down
 - CCOM Organizational structure =
 - CB = CCOM Incident Manager
 - TS = CCOM Planning Section Chief
 - TC = CCOM Operations Section Chief
 - MN = CCOM Logistics Section Chief

- 1000-ish: CB called to JP to talk about evacuations. Asked who was in charge of evacuation. She didn't know. Didn't know command folks other than NB. Shared 1-year old had a fever. Sounded very overwhelmed. CB shared need for GIS person to be involved in getting website map up to date. JP said she would contact GIS Jim Lugosi. CB would work on getting MS/BC to help focus on notifications. Agreed meeting needed at CCOM to talk about this issue STAT.
- 1010: MN begins evacuation list of employees (13 employees already evacuated at this time). Kris Devore from CRESA committed to providing dinner.
- 1037: SS from LOCOM shared that the City of LO would provide staff at NO COST to CCOM under existing IGA, similar to the law enforcement support. CB replied at 1046 to express appreciation. Forwarded to TC/MN, asked MN to add to the appreciations list.
- 1100: PGE Coordination Call:
 - Uptick in winds until 1300 hours
 - Not started re-energizing. Evacuating hydro-electric facilities in Silverton
 - Riverside Fire: pulling out Farraday staff to River Mill Site
 - Weather continues to be a concern until late afternoon Thursday
 - Will take 1-2 days to repair before power grid can be re-energized, restoring in segments.
- 1140: GS emails both Sheriff & CCOM to ask if we were aware of any 9-1-1 calls about BLM/Antifa setting fires in Clackamas County. I affirmed back at 1144 that we had not received any 9-1-1 calls on this topic.
- 1146: Received email from CCSO Chief Deputy that she had showed Mike Russell a social media post about BLM/Antifa. I replied that if we had received any calls, they would have been assigned to law units for follow-up investigation.
- 1230: Community Notification meeting at CCOM with JP, MS and TS to get a handle on notifications. Couldn't get BC freed from the COVID EOC, sent TS, MS and Linn County 9-1-1 Cathy Orcutt to notification meeting to get a handle on community notifications. They ended up going to EOC to tell EOC that we needed to stop putting notifications on the CCOM Ops Sups.
- 1255: CB email to MF and C9-1-1 Ops Manager, Lara Marzilli, to identify CCOM roles as MF had replied back to say Lara was involved in gathering available C9-1-1 staff availability for us.
- 1600: ESF 2 Daily Call
 - 14 active fires till burning, 46 fires in the state
 - Burned ½ million acres
 - Biggest fires = Echo Mountain, Beachie / Lionshead, Lane, Holliday Farm, 242 and many small fires.

- Trying to amplify message for 9-1-1 not to report smoke
 - Towers lost include: Halls Ridge Site (METCOM), and Vida Site
 - WEA notifications not going out consistently due to power outages & tower outages.

 - 1850: CB reviewed TC's "staffing change memo" which alerted staff of the change to minimum staffing, additional CT shifts, around the clock supervisory coverage, augmenting staffing with LOCOM and C9-1-1 employees and request for voluntary cancelled vacations.

 - 1922: TS send email about evacuation notice process for the overnight. Process took most of this afternoon to sort out. Lt Ashby will get evac notices. Toni / Michael will complete notifications from home to keep these off the operations floor.

 - 2143: D2 makes request to CB for additional cots or sleeping spaces for staff who are sleeping on floor at CCOM. CB answered email at 2157 and will add this to morning issues list.
-

Thursday, September 10th

- 0051: TS email recommendation from her team that LOCOM is best situation as evacuation destination, given current technologies. CB replied at 0633 with support & said MN/CB will evaluate fund balance and for TS to provide some cost estimates for move, if known.

- 0111: TS email to Joel Palanuk about setting up additional phones. CB replied at 0632 to say "yes, please pursue and ask State OEM to see if they will support"

- 0731: CB Email to E-Board and Administrator Schmidt re: call volumes, and 5 operational changes (increasing minimums, additional call-taker shifts, around the clock sup coverage, augmenting staff from LOCOM/C9-1-1, and voluntary cancellation of vacations) along with plans to prepare LOCOM for an evacuation destination. Notice to E-Board that I would likely need to conduct emergency procurement via the Contingency Funds.

- PIC still sending people to 9-1-1. Continuous circle.

- 0955: Notice from Administrator Schmidt that an all-employee message would be going out offering Wildfire Leave. Pre-notice given to supervisors that we may find a direct operational impact shortly.

- 1148: CB email to CCOM Techs & Sups regarding notice from TS that discussion of moving OC to Level 2 is happening in EOC. CB knew this would expand

number of staff who would need to personally evacuate. Wanted techs & sups to get early start if needed.

- 1148: MN email to CB: Facilities has been inundated with smoke calls, Only 4 people working.
- 1154: CB email to EC regarding additional Facilities help due to smoke inundation at CCOM. And concern that there isn't enough staff support working to prioritize needs of 24/7 facilities like ours.
- 1205: EC replied to email. JJ on his way to CCOM and prioritizing our needs.
- 1225: GS sends out email to all employees, closing county buildings for all non-essential employees.
- 1228: CB sends email out to all of CCOM notifying them that ALL CCOM employees are considered essential right now. And if they are working remotely to continue unless otherwise directed by their manager.
- 1335: CB email to GS, as C9-1-1 agreement went into his spam filter. Ask GS to sign agreement.
- 1336-ish: Toni Sexton notified us that Oregon City would be within the Level 2 evacuation area. TS, TC and I agreed that this mean that we should move forward with evacuating C-COM. Immediate calls were made to LOCOM to see how many work stations they could provide us. SS told TC that she could provide 3 call-taking work stations. TC/CB CONFIRM DECISION VIA PHONE CALL TO EVACUATE CALL-TAKING TO LOCOM. Tony wants to inform floor staff in person before email is sent out.
- 1338: CB emails E-Board & GS regarding moving call-taking over to LOCOM at 1500 hours on this day.
- 1350: CB notification via email to CCOM Techs, TQACs and Sups via email regarding move to LOCOM. TS begins working on extricating herself from the EOC so she can return to CCOM. TC is already on-site there.
- 1351: CB sends email notice to CRESA, WCCCA, METCOM and BOEC that CCOM will be relocating. All partner agencies respond with "how can we help?"
- 1353: Board of Commissioners Emergency Policy Session / Discussion of whether BLM/Antifa set fires. CCSO talks to the commissioners re: rumor/misinformation.

- 1355-ish: KD calls CB from WCCCA and indicates that they have 8 workstations that we could have if we wanted to dispatch out of WCCCA and send call-taking to LOCOM. Asked her to call TC to confirm he wanted to split his operations.
- 1356: JG sends the “Tactical Pause” message to TC for reading over all radio channels.
- 1402: FY received “Tactical Pause” to read over all of CCOM radio channels, slowly. Affirms decision to evacuate CCOM.
- 1410: Notification made to employees via email and FB employee group that decision has been made to evacuate CCOM. Justin Meyers responds to FB group “where am I needed?”
- 1424: FY asks MN about hotel rooms for staff in Hillsboro. Authorized hotel search at 1500 hours to MN.
- 1425: MF calls CB from Gladstone PD and asked how he can help. CB sends him to CCOM to be present with TC & TS as additional management influence. MF heads to CCOM
- 1437: CB updates regional partners with split location to LOCOM/WCCCA
- 1443: CB email to E-Board regarding split location to LOCOM/WCCCA and that we did not include the PIC in our evacuation plans.
- 1428: Philip Mason-Joyner advises that PIC is working with Tech Services for PIC staff to work remotely for the rest of the day and as long as needed.
- 1532: CB email to Frank Kuchta, Andrew Phelps and Matt Marheine at OEM that CCOM would be evacuating its facility and splitting call-taking / dispatch.
- 1612: City of Lake Oswego closed the City for 9/11/20 in order to allow our staff to get settled and to minimize COVID risk to everyone involved.
- 1614: GS email to County EMT about Oregon City under Level 2 evacuation order. Need to transition “all county operations” away from Oregon City. GS closes all county offices tomorrow.
- 1738: CB email to the Member Board, Fire & Law Services about relocation of services to LOCOM/WCCCA.
- 1800-2100: Movement of radio dispatching over to WCCCA. Delay in transitioning law nets due to militia problems and Net 1 closure for reports of someone going after an unmarked officer. Issues that had to be resolved:

- 1902: Matt Pascall from OCPD notified CB that any calls that go to PIC should be sent to OCPD call hotline at 971-204-0426. They want to capture contact information.
 - 1938: CB texted GS/NB about closure of PIC again. Closed at 1930. Was told it would reopen at 0800 tomorrow. Clackamas is asking Multnomah County to take calls. I shared OCPD call center number and was told that was unrelated to EOC as Oregon City is doing its own center for its residents.
 - 2143: CB email to Member Board & County EMT with notification that CCOM had fully evacuated the facility as of 2100 hours. Approximate physical effort was 7 hours (technical work continued remotely until about 0300 to move the disaster recovery server). Also notice provided that our employees no longer had access to email
 - 2200 TECH ISSUE: Rolled CAD Production Servers over to Disaster Recovery System. Work took much of the night to complete. Ended around 0400.
-

Friday, September 11th

- Need to split 2 operational schedules (TC working on this)
- Hotel Mess: Several people showed up to hotels who were demanding the county credit card. MN navigated these issues.
- Tech issues:
 - Text-to-9-1-1 ~ struggling to get this functional (due to voice call-volume and tech issues, turned this off to minimize split focus of CTs)
 - Can't hear 9-1-1 ~ Phone issues required some tweaking
- Positive Issues
 - Jeff Jorgenson & Facilities were super helpful in evacuating
 - Ron / Fred / Ross Kiely / MF, wife & sons = amazing help
- 1149: CB received call from Canby PD, regarding BLM/Antifa rumors. Asked CPD to work with law liaisons on affirming message.
- 1256: PSAP Direct Dials still coming into CCOM. Suspect these are coming from other PSAP's. MN began collecting offers of help from this request.
- 1311: CB email to GS / NB with concerns about plans for lack of PIC for the coming weekend. Expressed concerns about call spikes when PIC closes. Requested keeping PIC open with people who have credible information until evacuations slow down or end due to liability involved.
- 1345: CB onsite at LOCOM.

- 1600-ish: CB onsite at WCCCA.
 - 1657: Email from NB to CB/GS, saying that Portland Fire and Multnomah County will take calls 24/7 over the weekend from 1900-0800 on weeknights. Call volume to PIC was 250 on this day.
 - 1900-ish: Ben (Supervisor at WCCCA) received notice from fire of risk of “catastrophic plume collapse” event possible. Ben obtained additional information from fire safety officer that this has been an on-going threat with one of the fires and has been shared at every briefing as a safety element of this situation. CB followed up with WCCCA & CCOM Mgt Team re: ongoing nature of threat. Provided Ben with copy of the “tactical pause” verbiage so he would have a model of wording in case any future tactical pause was called during this event.
 - 2300-ish: TC call to CB re: schedule issues.
-

Saturday, September 12th

- 0125: D2 email to CB regarding concerns at WCCCA which included:
 - Appreciated care & concern by management
 - Dispatch floor at WCCCA was very smoky
- 0142: Air Quality was over 500 today (worst in world according to the news), so not sure if can do much to improve smoke situation.
- 0547: JE email to TC/CB: Call Taker schedule completed.
- 0900: CCOM Management Team meeting by Zoom
- Emergency staffing pages started going off at 0300 each morning for schedule gaps. At this stage, we were still operating off of one schedule for both sites, trying to abide by union contract. This resulted in a ton of schedule gaps which started being paged out as soon as morning D2 started her shift for the day.
- 0944: CB email to Scott Anderson (CCSO Lieutenant) regarding CCOM needs (copied Sups/Mgt/LN):
 - Radio Traffic needs to be EMERGENCY TRAFFIC only. Key issues should be evacuation & emergency issues as key priorities. All other traffic needs to be handled on non-monitored CCOM radio channel.
 - CCSO TIP LINE should NOT say to call 9-1-1 or 655-8211 because we are getting slammed with rumors & SSP/SSV calls. Need to preserve 9-1-1 for emergencies in progress only.
 - Can we handle evacuations like SWAT calls as dispatchers are familiar with SWAT/closed net procedures?

- Only have 3 LAW DISPATCH positions because we need 6 for FIRE DISPATCH.
- 0954: CB email to SS with appreciation for ECATS stats & generosity of LOCOM.
- 1000-ish: Scott Anderson / Mike Copenhaver called CB to talk through needs. Shared how pounded our Law Nets are. Dispatcher struggling to keep up. Concerned about officer safety risk if this continues. Need to get our law nets stable. Scott said he would work with Law Liaisons to see what could be done.
- 1000-ish: TC calls CB: Schedule pressure continues to mount. Too many employees are calling in to see what they are working. Considerable angst going on with people trying to plan their week. Permission asked & granted for following actions:
 - Split schedule into LOCOM and WCCCA schedule.
 - Quit trying to focus on union contract expectations. Side conversation with FY to explain we will aim to be consistent and get everyone paid under emergency staffing.
 - Move all employees to automatic 12 hour shifts to provide additional coverage and include MOT into an employee's planned schedule,
- 1051: CB Email to all employees & 3 directors of LOCOM, WCCCA, C9-1-1. Key topics:
 - Will email your home emails & post daily updates in CCOM FB Employee group
 - Fire Status ~ hoping fire will transition tomorrow to more normalized operations
 - Evacuation Status ~ staying until all evacuation notices have lifted & we can clean the center. Initial goal = Friday of next week for return.
 - Text-to-9-1-1 ~ we turned it off
 - Radio Traffic ~ Working with law enforcement to tame the nets
 - Public Inquiry Center ~ should be staffed 24/7 now
 - Shift Schedule ~ 12 hours, splitting schedules, let us call you about your schedule.
 - Smoke ~ air quality bad. Getting some better masks
 - Tech needs ~ TS is triaging. Don't go to techs directly
 - Employee needs ~ MN is handling
 - Now & Later Buckets ~ De advice
 - Thank you ~ We're all struggling, but proud of you! It's okay to need help.
- 1108: Forwarded first Incident Action Plan (IAP) from EOC (came into CB's inbox at 1801 on 9/11/20)

- 1114: FY asked TC/CB about engaging with TERT support coordination throughout state of Oregon. CB replied to say “we support you, but worried about overcommitting with this assignment when our center is struggling.”
- 1130-ish: Received phone call from Mike Russell, CCSO PIO, regarding lack of social media coordination and earlier tipline request. Mike was stepping up to begin to share info through CCSO social media profiles. We talked through needs from CCOM perspective.
- 1200: CB forwarded employee email to Ross Kiely, AFSCME rep, after text exchange with Ross who was asking how to support CCOM. Began including him in daily updates so he could stay informed about what we were doing.
- 1207: Scott Anderson, CCSO, replied to my earlier email about CCOM needs. Doing the best they can to contain radio traffic. Continue having CCOM broadcast for EMERGENCY TRAFFIC as that seems to help.
- 1255: TC email to all CCOM employees (also sent to everyone’s personal email) with this info:
 - Going to 12-hour shifts for all staff
 - Goal is to get the schedule finished by Monday for the coming week
- 1303: CB email to CCSO Law Liaison Scott Anderson: “Law Dispatch is telling that Kollias is saying Net 2 should NOT be EMERGENCY TRAFFIC” unless “a boss calls a boss”....we’re exploring capacity for 3rd radio net at the moment, but we’re still struggling with radio traffic volume.
- 1414: CB email to CCSO Law Liaison Scott Anderson about Net 2 still being pounded. He replied that he would forward to patrol captain to see if he wants to send a message out to patrol.
- 1421: CB email to Scott Anderson, CCSO. Plan is to return 3 days after all evacuation risk lifted. Need tech transition time. Asked for command post staffing plan for evening contacts.
- 1504: TC provides first copy of the supervisor’s schedule for the coming week.
- 1544: CB email to MN with appreciation for taking care of our people.
- 1622: EOC created a donations page at <https://www.clackamas.us/wildfires/help>
- 1654: TC sends out leadership schedule to the sups & LN, LS. CB forwarded to TS/MN.
- 1755: CB emails EOC Ops Fire to ask who the fire liaisons are for next 24 hours as BP struggled to get clear info.

Sunday, September 13th

- 0900: CCOM Mgt Team Meeting via Zoom (TC, TS, MN, CB). Key topics included:
 - Discussion about the replications & impacts
 - Peer Support discussion: Meg asked if it was okay to activate employee's "special person" that we had collected in the previous year. CB gave permission for this.
- 1215: CB email to all employees, Law/Fire Users, Member Board, County EMT & MAJCS 9-1-1 directors with the following topics:
 - Call-Taking at LOCOM now has 4 positions. Still seeing spikes every time the PIC doesn't have credible information.
 - Dispatch at WCCCA: Still in crisis to make manageable. 6 dispatchers on fire, 4 Law Enforcement nets. Trying to use EMERGENCY TRAFFIC to keep law nets free, but plea to reduce unnecessary radio traffic would be appreciated.
 - CAD Replication Feeds were disrupted due to evacuation. This means PulsePoint and Records Managements Systems (RMS) are down. Public believes this is part of the conspiracy. (Initially thought we could get replication moved back to CCOM with a couple of days, but this was delayed for a week.)
 - Return to Oregon City Factors: Workload stability, Evacuation levels, Air Quality in OC, Tech needs, Cleaning of CCOM.
- 1247: Joel Palanuk from Noble 9-1-1 offers 5 more VESTA laptops.
- 1303: Malcolm McDonald, from Community Corrections, offers up staff to move/clean CCOM along with vans.
- 1340: Rick Huffman, Chief of GFD email: *"From the fires I was on to working a night as Fire Liaison at CCOM, your dispatchers are amazing, efficient, personable and their teamwork was incredible. Thank you."*
- 1400: CB to LOCOM. Call volume lower than previous visit, but still very steady and constant. Still experiencing some power load issues. Had to move call-takers onto LOCOM floor due to loss of positions in our CCOM CT room.
- 1525-ish: CB visit to WCCCA. Primary concern: Law Enforcement nets continue to be unmanageable. Dispatchers are having a hard time staying on law nets for more than 1-2 hours before they are becoming overwhelmed.

- Action Step: CB, TB, D2 called Scott Anderson, CCSO, to express concern about the continuous hammering of the law radio nets. Asked for deputies to self-dispatch on lower priority calls via MDC. Anderson said Wurpes, Cate are pushing self-dispatch.
 - Additional ask: Corrections / Charlie units still doing home checks on busy nets.
 - 1620: Email from Fred Charlton, Chief of CCFD: ***I had the honor of being at dispatch for a few days working as the Fire Liaison. Your team of dispatchers and supervisors did an incredible job. Their engagement with us, their expertise, leadership and technical competence made this a successful operation. A thank you via email isn't much, but please share my personal appreciation for you and your team!!***
 - [Supervisors had begun sharing messages of appreciation to each other via all-employee emails, but since not all could see their email, CB asked sups to hold off on sharing and send to MN to collect all appreciation emails so that we could include them later in reports.]
 - 1700: CB onsite at WCCCA. Chatted with BP/TB at their shift change regarding the law nets being pounded. BP's observation was that the night shift sergeants were being helpful to control the nets and then day shift sergeants were coming on shift and messing everything up. Playing groundhog's day trying to get the radio nets under control. BP had gotten in a great rhythm of checking with the law/fire liaisons at the command posts to get team on the same page with CCOM.
 - 2115 TECH ISSUE: CAD CRASH at all 4 MAJCS SITES due to SQL Storage being full. Added 2 TB of data
-

Monday, September 14th

- 0800: CCOM Mgt Team Meeting via Zoom. Topics included:
 - Technical Stability: SM/Justin Haines working with CAD vendor on replication and disaster recovery server. CAD CRASHED LAST NIGHT.
 - Still managing a lot of map updates for evacuation notifications.
 - Call-Taking still getting pounded every time community notifications going how. Running moderate to heavy on calls.
 - Dispatch: Still struggling with law dispatch. Open Net 3 earlier in the day at 0700 instead of 1000 which had been day prior (and 1200 "normally")
 - Schedule: entire team on 12-hour shifts with flexibility for sups to release people at 10-hour mark to provide predictability of start times for staff. Staff grumpy at WCCCA with schedule only done for 2 days right now.
 - CCOM NEED:

- Ask of WCCCA/LOCOM Please reject all VIP or news media visits under COVID rationale.
- 1021: CB email to all employees, E-Board, Union, MAJCS Directors. Topics included:
 - OPS Schedule: 12 hour shifts official with flexibility on end time release.
 - Timesheets: asked County to add flexibility to hours worked entry
 - Call-Taking: Still getting pounded.
 - Dispatch: Still struggling to manage law dispatch. Still looking at opening & staffing 4th net to manage this via MDC.
 - Tech Stability: navigating post CAD-CRASH, trying to eliminate smoke frm CCOM.
 - Evacuation Status: Level 1, Air Quality at 341, Operational Stability & Tech Stability in question, Move back estimated on Friday of this week or middle of next week.
- 1100-ish: Joel Palanuk from Noble 9-1-1 offered Melissa, his health & wellness coordinator who has experience with wildland fires.
- 1234: CB email to APCO-NENA group to describe re-entry factors and current status. Continued ask for sheltering TC/TS so they can focus on CCOM needs. Huge shout-out to LOCOM/WCCCA.
- 1313: CB email to CCOM Member Board, Fire/Law Services & County EMT with the following topics:
 - Factors guiding re-entry plan / Estimating 9/23/20 for re-entry
 - Bubble ask for TC/TS
 - CCOM employees don't have email right now.
 - Donation info to MN
- 1455: Email from JH to CCOM Sups & Mgt. Noticed need for staff to have own place to go & vent. Staff feeling awkward kicking WCCCA out of their respite area. JH asked WCCCA sups for help on this and they blocked out the WCCCA Board room for CCOM. They moved in refrigerator and closed blinds so room is completely private. CCOM Peer Team using space when needed.
- 1500-ish: CB watched Clackamas County Press Conference:
 - Should begin seeing some containment within next few days.
 - 3 additional new fires
 - Wilhoit Fire = 776 acres, 100% lined
 - Unger Fire = 100% lined, 378 acres
 - Dowty Fire = 1500 acres, 20% lined

- 314 firefighters across region, people still need to stay out of area, falling trees underway to contain fire. Don't go to front lines and fight fires for your own safety.
 - Air quality / health still hazardous. 10% increase in ER visits. Risk to 65+ older, cardiovascular, increased risk of heart attacks, pregnant mothers
 - Check AQI regularly

 - 1504: CB received ECATS report from SS. First sign that Call-Taking stats are slowing down.
 - 1530-ish: Tech Team: Need to discuss rolling back from DR to production servers. Will take several hours.

 - 1600: MAJCS Tech Briefing via Zoom Conference Call (Tech Team with MAJCS 9-1-1 Directors of all 4 jurisdictions).

 - 1823: Infamous Facebook post:
[Clackamas 9-1-1 - CCOM](#)
Published by [Cheryl Bledsoe](#) · September 14 at 6:23 PM · 23

Acronym Alert: As it relates to #ClackamasWildfires, BLM = Bureau of Land Management which is a firefighting resource.

Please put away the tinfoil hats.
#NotAConspiracy

The above FB post earned 100 comments and 86 shares and brought out the trolls. After first comment about how insensitive the tinfoil comment was, CB deleted the "Please put away the tinfoil hats" line of this post and apologized; however, the flames were already active.

 - 2117: D2 email to CB: People are tired, but first night there has been laughter in the center. Rotating people off law is helping a lot.
-

Tuesday, September 15th

- 0800: CCOM Mgt Team Meeting via Zoom. Topics include:
 - TS going to WCCCA today,
 - Tech Team going to LOCOM
 - Tonight, no CCOM supervisor at LOCOM (LS will be there)
 - Both sets of staff reportedly doing well.
 - TS meeting FB/SM at CCOM
 - Reported leak inside CCOM near kitchen. Will need to extract carpet. Smell is horrendous. Evaluating air quality inside building and impact of smoke on tech.
 - Production Rollback scheduled for 0500
 - MN planning to head to CCOM about 1000 hours.

- 5 laptops ordered (for future training room, could use now if they arrive in time....spoiler alert: they arrived day after we returned to CCOM)
- 0933: MAJCS Message entitled "Replication Interruption" went out to CCOM Member Board, Law & Fire Services (with BCC: to other 3 directors who were to send a modified version out to their users).
- 1023: CB email update to all employees, E-Board and MAJCS Directors. Topics included:
 - Operational Stability: Yellow status, starting to hit benchmarks
 - Call-Taking: Call Volume continues at 2x daily rate (1500 calls for the day prior)
 - Dispatch: Progress in radio traffic becoming more manageable
 - Tech Team going on-site at CCOM to assess tech needs for re-entry
 - CAD Production Server Roll-back scheduled for 9/22 at 0500
 - Trainees assigned utility status
 - FB/SM visiting LOCOM, CB heading to WCCCA at 1100 and LOCOM after. TC on order to rest today after his multiple site visits yesterday.
 - Evacuation Metrics:
 - Level 1
 - Air Quality still bad / 300 KN95 masks arriving tomorrow
 - Operational / Tech Stability: Yellow
 - Move-In Estimate: 9/23/20
 - Facebook Post: Request for employees not to engage in online conversation on CB's errant post. Send complaints to ccom@clackamas.us
- 1100-1300ish: CB goes on-site to WCCCA.
- 1156: Email from Tim Gerkman at Gladstone Police Dept: *"For what it is worth, from the outside looking in and from my perspective, the transition has been about as good as we (on our police end) could have hoped for. This is unprecedented and you always hope the plan comes together if ever needed. Thank you for your open communications with all of us. It is appreciated. Thank you to all of you working hard for us and our community members. Keep up the great work and take care. Tim."*
- 1453: Incoming Public Records Request for "all radio traffic relating to fires after 9/8/20"

Wednesday, September 16th

- 0025: Email from JE to TC: Fire dispatching slowed way down.

- 0740: ECAT report for CCOM still shows incoming calls, even though all calls being diverted to LOCOM. TS begins investigation to figure out what these phantom calls are.
- 0743: NB starts sending evacuation changes with map to ccom@clackamas.us, BC & JP. We receive a number of these changes from here on out. CB asked NB about status of Oregon City. Told that Fire Command expects Oregon City to drop out of evacuation levels. Estacada will also become Level 2. This change expected to take effect at 1400 hours today.
- 0800: CCOM Mgt Team Call via Zoom with the following topics:
 - Smoke Levels (CB began tracking numbers on AQI on afternoon of 9/15, kept grid of changes every 3-4 hours). Smoke at 0800 was 222 in Oregon City (then 351 by 1400 hours)
 - Data Requests: Direct users to Inform Browser. Only emergency requests will be triaged for whether they can be completed.
 - Evacuation levels change at 1400 today
 - Facility Evaluation from TS/Tech Team visit yesterday
 - Carpet need extraction
 - Janitorial services appears to have stopped after we evacuated
 - Very dusty / smoke, deep clean needed
 - DR server to Production Rollback on Tuesday, 9/22
 - JMc trying to figure out data set for the fire folks while replication is down. Net Motion also down for Fire users. He's trying to script some reports.
 - List of positions ready for move-back? Fire pod should have 3 positions out, missing CAD or phone or genovation keypad. Should take about ½ day to restore phone system
 - MN planning to figure out trailer situation / storage unit access
 - TC: list of projects to do before we return
 - Carpets need cleaning
 - Smoke needs eradicated
 - Temperature is hot inside center
 - Priority 1 = Facilities work effort
 - Plan for CCOM MGT to meet on-site at CCOM on Thursday afternoon at 1300 to go over list of re-entry tasks.
- 1042: CB Email to all staff with the following topics:
 - Operational Stability: Call-Taking at YELLOW. Dispatch seeing marked improvements. Enhancement shifts being eliminated.
 - Tech Assessment of CCOM completed
 - Facilities Assessment: Number of issues to address
 - Firewall work planned
 - CAD server work planned

- Inventory work delayed due to air quality
 - Stats requests being triaged
 - On-site Support: TC visiting LOCOM & WCCCA
 - Food Plan: being slowed down
 - Peer Outreach: 3 levels of response underway
 - Review of evacuation metrics: 9/23/20 looking probable for re-entry.
- 1140: CB email to Member Board, Fire/Law Services and County EMT with review of topics above from employee email.
 - 1320-ish: Evacuation Levels DROPPED for Oregon City.
 - 1525: Email from FY to AC/CB with following asks:
 - Keep enhancement shifts for people returning home
 - Travel time pay to-from WCCCA [We declined this since we made hotel rooms available.]
 - Ross/AFSCME willing to help re-entry process
 - By end of this day, it looked like we were back on-track for a Wednesday, 9/23/20 re-entry plan.
 - 1733: Email from JP that PGE just sent out a notice that the Mt Hood Corridor has had power restored to the area that was shut off.
 - 1837: Email from Greg Geist, Director of Water Environmental Services (WES):
"You are doing a wonderful job, Chery!! Thank you for the update and I hope you are personally doing well. Greg."

Thursday, September 17th

- 0800: CCOM Mgt Team Meeting with MN, TC, TS, CB. Topics included:
 - Friday Operations for Fire (We had received notice that Fire units would be out in communities. No significant impact to CCOM)
 - Facilities timeline reviewed.
 - Union / Employee list of items considered. Will ask employees to identify who might need time to return home. No additional time given for commute from home if declined the hotel nearby. People can choose comp time instead of pay, if desired, to 200 hour comp cap (which was an increase due to COVID)
 - Learned that some of the ringing phones inside CCOM was PIC trying to do direct transfers. Putting message on internal voicemail that tells callers "if you were transferred here, call 655-8211 instead". Likely the PIC trying to transfer calls into 8211 was probably the source of many of the phantom calls into the center that TS was investigating earlier.

- Air Quality Index = 343 in Oregon City at 0600, 242 at 0800, 300 at 1000 hours, 296 at 1100 hours, 197 at 1739 on this day
- Net 3 will open at 1000 hours today.
- MN beginning to collect & track down procurement card receipts from folks.
- PIC should be covered by Multnomah County after 1900 hours tonight. Still getting 100 calls per day

- 0949: CB received ECATS Phone stats report from LOCOM, Still about 1400 calls per day (about double regular Sept call volume)

- 1050: CB Email to all employees, E-Board, MAJCS Directors, Ross included the following topics:
 - Call-Taking: Steady at 1200-1300 calls per day / In line with 4th of July numbers. Lower than what we have been seeing
 - Dispatch: radio operations have returned to normal with Net 3 opening at 1000 hours for Law Enforcement
 - Wildfire Leave: Shared that county offered wildfire leave to assist with evacuation implications. Please let supervisors know if you need additional time to move back and get settled. This will affect our placement of “enhancement shifts”
 - Payroll / Timesheets: Put actual hours worked.
 - Facility Work: Still working to get all of the issues addressed.
 - Firewall Work: Scheduled for 9/18 at 0600. Will impact CAD2CAD and LEDS for all 4 centers.
 - CAD Server Work: Scheduled for 9/22/20 at 0500. Will take CAD down for 10 minutes and MDC’s down for 40 minutes.
 - CCOM On-Site: Mgt Team going on-site to CCOM at 1300 to map out re-entry plan. TC going to LOCOM only today.
 - Re-Entry / Evacuation Status: Out of evacuation footprint, air quality worse, operational stability achieved, move-in estimate is still 9/23 but schedule tightened which means we have little flexibility if any of our plan fails. Make yourselves mentally prepared for a later move-in date. Want to be realistic.

- 1300: On-site meeting at CCOM with TC, TS, MN, CB, MS, Tera Asboe, Chris Turner.

- 1725: Email from JE to employees titled “Kudos from Lt. Cate”

“Here is a snippet of an email I received from Chris Cate. I think you all should stand proud. Every single person here, whether behind a radio, behind a phone, or behind a computer is what made all of this as successful as it has been. It’s noticed and appreciated. Jodi.”

I just wanted to say we know how crazy it must be working during this time, in a foreign place, with equipment that is different and way more people working off your radio channels. You guys are all doing amazing and working through this better than anyone could have expected. Thank you for all your work and keeping deputies (and all the other LEOs helping) safe... We really appreciate the hard work!

*Hang in there!
Chris Cate"*

Friday, September 18th

- 0000: FLOOD WATCH / HEAVY RAINS OCCURRED IN OREGON CITY
- 0559: Email to CB from Rob Wurpes: significant damage at the transition center. Just want to make sure you have someone checking on the CCOM building.
- 0713: CB received ECATS report again from LOCOM. Still receiving 1200 calls. Asked SS what the normal LOCOM call volume is for this time of year....ranged from 171-269 last year over 9/14/19 to 9/16/19.
- 0800: CCOM Mgt Team Zoom Call
 - Learned that the PIC line closed down last night during the Flash Flood alert. Caused another spike in referrals and 9-1-1 calls. CB plans to follow up with NB again about the no-notice closure of the PIC.
 - MN will go on-site to CCOM today [learned that flooding caused 3 additional leaks and wet carpet throughout center, damage mostly on DM side of the building.]
 - Air Quality in OC = 169 at 0700, 158 at 0900, 161 at 0900 and 154 at 1100.
 - Received new refrigerators from Facilities.
 - Consoles were all restocked with sanitizing supplies, handsets, all wiped down by trainees.
 - Monday work party start time around 1000 hours.
 - Tuesday tech work is planned out with Julio, Central Square, SM and Derrick Berg. SM/DB will be at LOCOM.
 - Joel Palanuk from Noble 9-1-1 on standby for Wednesday. SM will bring command posts back on Tuesday.
 - CCOM Building is going to be ozoned over the weekend which means everyone needs to stay out of building.
- 0834: CB email to NB re: PIC closure last night during Flash Flood Alert. Asked for schedule for PIC and what we can expect for coming week.

- 1008: CB Email to all employees, MAJCS Directors, Ross, E-Board with the following topics:
 - Call-Taking: Steady call volume, spikes for last night's flooding event. PIC closed down last night. Hours will be 0700-1900 through the weekend.
 - Dispatch: Returned to normal with Net 3 opening at 1000 hours
 - Schedule Note: Wildfire Leave is only available while Level 3 evacuation note. Apologies to staff for not understanding leave. Despite leave, will work with staff on re-entry to their homes. Tell a supervisor if you need some assistance with these needs.
 - Facilities Work: underway. 3 new leaks.
 - CAD Server work: Scheduled for Tuesday
 - Re-Entry Plan
 - On-Site Support: Fewer visits to LOCOM/WCCCA over weekend because focus on re-entry tasks now. We are available by text & will chat with sups/leads on-site.
 - Evacuation / Re-Entry status: Goal still = 9/23/20 after 1500.
 - 1025: Email from TB to CB: Lots of requests for sandbags after overnight flooding. DM website isn't up to date. Not sure where to refer callers.
 - 1028: Called NB, sent text to NB and email to EOC PIO / PIC & EOC Command asking for sandbag information to be updated. Told TB to refer callers to the PIC.
 - 1033: Text back from NB, saying Clackamas Fire might have some sandbags. She doesn't know if their DM website is updated.
 - 1053: CB email to Member Board, Fire/Law Users, County EMT with following topics:
 - Call-Taking: Busy/Steady
 - Dispatch: returned to normal operations
 - Facility work: new leaks being addressed
 - Firewall work failed
 - CAD Server work scheduled for Tuesday
 - CCOM Re-entry plan
 - Appreciation for support during this evacuation. Very complex.
 - CCOM will still not be "business as usual" for likely 2 weeks post return
 - 1717: Notice from Katie Wilson that Multnomah County will be taking over call center at 1900 tonight and will answer the phones until 0700 on Monday. CB forwarded this notice to the sups at 1724.
 - 2233: Email from Joel Palanuk, plans to be on-site on 9/23 to get phone system working again.
-

Saturday, September 19th

- 0000 TECH ISSUE: LOCOM CAD Positions have switch issues and all slow down. Had to swap out switch types.
- TC visited LOCOM/WCCCA

Sunday, September 20th

- 0408 TECH ISSUE CAD CRASHED FOR 2ND TIME. Took about 90 minutes to get back online. Similar memory crash issue.
 - After the morning CAD crash, nothing additional scheduled
-

Monday, September 21st

- 0800: CCOM Mgt Team Call (MN, TC, TS, CB)
 - CCOM Facility ~ work party today. 3 people from Corrections, Chris/Tera, MN, TC, Facilities, meeting at 0900 today.
 - Chairs were ozoned over weekend
 - Confirming transition schedule & tracking down wireless headsets to ensure everyone has their headsets on the way back.
 - Call-Takers will start at CCOM at 1600 on Wednesday (not 1500 as originally planned)
 - At 1700, will have 3 police dispatchers at CCOM.
 - At 1900, will have fire dispatch returned.
 - Fire Pod is already for return at CCOM.
 - On Tuesday, Scott / Derek will be at LO, FB/MS will be at WCCCA for tech work. Will likely take 2 hours to complete. Then, will begin breaking down LOCOM to return tech to CCOM.
 - For Wednesday, will have 3 sups
 - For WCCCA clean-out, Aurora Fire Chief offered trailer. Will aim to pick up staff at WCCCA Thursday (this was actually completed on Tuesday of this week instead of Thursday).
 - Need to get Records Clerk access to Logging Recorder at WCCCA/LOCOM (TS working on this issue)
- 0947: CB email to CCOM employees, E-Board & MAJCS Directors. Topics included:
 - Call-Taking: Steady & manageable
 - Dispatch: Regular operations

- Kudos & appreciations: Being collected for future debrief / celebration. Use Guardian Tracker to enter your kudos for others.
 - Facilities: Completed a tremendous amount of work over the weekend.
 - Move-In party today at CCOM with TC/MN leading effort with Community Corrections
 - CAD Server Work: tomorrow morning at 0500
 - CCOM Re-Entry: on track, schedule transition aiming to minimize travel between sites.
 - On-Site Support: CB visiting both LOCOM/WCCCA today as both managers are working on re-entry issues.
-
- 1826: NB email about weather rain/wind event expected for 9/23/20 evening (during our return timeframe).
-

Tuesday, September 22nd

- 0400+: CAD Server move from Disaster Recovery to Production Environment. TS & Tech Team involved in all of this work effort.

- 0800: Mgt Team Meeting via Zoom (MN, TC, TS, CB). Topics included:
 - CAD Server work went well. CAD was moved over by 0530. MDCs were back online by 0545. Replication data needs some time to catch up. Could take several days to come back online.
 - Only one position down (#10) at CCOM.
 - TS will be scheduling meeting with MAJCS Tech Team to AAR the tech issues that came up during this evacuation period (Mon-Tues of next week)
 - Noble 9-1-1, Dave Gory and Perry will be on-site at CCOM at 0830.
 - Facilities: Got Sups office cleaned out, surplus removed, garbage gone

- 0947: CB email to all employees, E-Board and MAJCS 9-1-1 Directors with these topics:
 - SM/Derrick working at LOCOM today to pick up CCOM items & break down positions
 - WCCCA: MN/TC/Tera/Chris heading out to pick up CCOM stuff
 - Day of the Nerf Gun War at WCCCA to celebrate their telecommunicator week
 - CAD Server work was successful
 - On track for re-entry
 - Payroll Issues: please be patient if there are errors. We will work through them.
 - After-Action Report is being planned
 - WE MOVE HOME TOMORROW!

- 1036: CB email to all employees, Member Board, Fire/Law Services, EMT with CCOM re-entry plan along with lengthy list of appreciations for County Facilities, City of Lake Oswego, WCCCA, County Tech Services, Aurora Fire Dept, Columbia 9-1-1, Community Corrections, CCOM Employees,

- 1051: CB received email from Clackamas Ops Chief, Mike Corless:

“Cheryl, I just want to personally thank you for your leadership and to your team for how they stepped up during these last two weeks. It was an honor and a privilege to be the liaison on Monday (7th) evening and work with the fire side on the multitude of calls that were received. I am not sure how this would have turned out if we were at our staffing and morale levels of a few short years ago. You have accomplished a lot in your short time and it has been an honor serving with you. Have a good day. Mike Corless II”

- 1053: CB received email from County Auditor, Jodi Cochran:

“Good morning, Cheryl. I have so appreciated these updates – and value the heightened awareness of the great work and collaboration you are leading. Your gracious appreciation of the extreme efforts of so many speaks highly of your leadership and the abilities of your team and partners. We are fortunate as a county team to work with such committed professionals and caring individuals. Thank you. Best, Jodi”

Wednesday, September 23rd

- 0800: CCOM Mgt Team mtg via Zoom. Topics included
 - Discussion with Sue Scobert about public assistance dates (she was worried that submission deadline was this week. County gave CCOM soe extra time to complete this).
 - Story about backing utility trailer into bay & turning it around (funny moment)
 - Jeremy will be last supervisor at WCCCA. Will clean up with JulieAnn and then head to CCOM.
 - “Normal Schedule” resumes at 0500 tomorrow
 - Text-to-9-1-1 will return when we get back to CCOM.
 - Beginning to pull ECATS reports on call volume data.
 - New Supervisors schedule will start this weekend. TC developed rollover for the new schedule.
- 1425: Receive notice of rush request for the audio of the “Tactical Pause” due to Oregonian article that was critical of response to wildfires. CB informed NB, GS, County PIO Kimberly Dinwiddie so they would be aware of the request and possible request from media for interviews.

<https://www.oregonlive.com/news/2020/09/no-happy-ending-in-estacada-to-wildfires-as-debate-erupts-over-performance-of-firefighters.html>

- CCOM Re-Entry Day
 - MN & Trainees made CCOM look beautiful. Cookies from Amy who was on FMLA/Baby leave during incident. Balloons & flowers everywhere. Office looked very nice.
 - 1500 Mgt Team all on-site at CCOM including BS, JE (JH came later as he wrapped up at WCCCA with JulieAnn. BP also visited & hung out with sups/TC in new Supervisor Office). Tech Team also arrived on-site to help with return.
 - 1600 Call-Taking Returned to CCOM
 - 1700 Law Dispatch Returned to CCOM
 - 1730 Dinner delivered by MN from Hawaiian Time
 - 1900 Fire Dispatch Returned to CCOM
 - 2030: Jeremy / JulieAnn return to CCOM with final boxes and items from WCCCA location.
-

Thursday, September 24th

- 0500: Shifts returned to “normal operations” and 12 hour shifts were removed.
- Other Post-Event Activities:
 - Therapy Dog Visits (at least 4 of these occurred)
 - Employee debriefing, coordinated by Peer Team, with MH clinician (via Zoom & in person). Should talk to BS about 2nd debriefing which was a complete failure (not CCOM’s fault, no show of Responder Life & MH Clinician).
 - AAR Contract established w/E-Board approval
 - Fred stepping up in state to take on more TERT responsibility
 - Guardian Tracker peer stories coming in
 - Fire Chiefs provide 4 meals in appreciation for efforts of CCOM during evacuation to reach all employees.

Key to Initials:


- AP = Angie Peterson, C-COM D2 / Peer Team Coordinator
- BC = Bill Conway, C-COM EMS TQAC
- BP = Ben Postlewait, C-COM Supervisor
- BS = Beth Spreadborough, C-COM Supervisor / Peer Team Coordinator
- CB = Cheryl Bledsoe, C-COM Director
- D2 = Lead Dispatcher
- EC = Elizabeth Comfort, Clackamas Finance Director (oversees Facilities Dept)
- FB = Fawn Brenner, C-COM Technician, mapping / response plan expert
- FY = Fred Yungbluth, C-COM D1 / Union President
- GS = Gary Schmidt, Clackamas County Administrator
- JB = Jim Band, Oregon City Police Chief / E-Board Chair
- JD = Jim Davis, Canby Fire Chief / E-Board Member
- JE = Jodi Edmeier, C-COM Supervisor
- JG = Josh Gehrke, Clackamas Fire EMS Chief / E-Board Member
- JH = Jeremy Hipes, C-COM Supervisor
- JHa = John Hartsock, C800 Radio System Program Manager
- JJ = Jeff Jorgenson, Clackamas Facilities Manager
- JM = Justin Meyer, C-COM D2 / WCCCA Lead
- JMc = Josh McGloghlon, C-COM Technician, SQL/ programming/stats guy
- JN = Jackie Nerski, Clackamas Disaster Management Public Inquiry Center Lead
- JP = Jaime Poole, Clackamas Disaster Management Notification Lead
- KA = Katie Alexander, C-COM TQAC
- KD = Kelly Dutra, WCCCA Director
- KS = Karey Stidham, C-COM D2 / Union Vice President
- LN = Lindsey Nicholson, C-COM TQAC / LOCOM Lead
- LS = LeAnne Senger, LOCOM Lead
- MF = Mike Fletcher, C9-1-1 Director
- MN = Meg Neece, C-COM Executive Assistant
- MS = Michael Smith, C-COM / MAJCS Tech Coordinator
- NB = Nancy Bush, Emergency Manager
- NM = Noel Metz, C-COM D2
- RP = Ron Polluconi, C800 Radio System Technical Manager
- SB = Suz Baughman, C-COM D1 / LOCOM Lead
- SH = Stephen Hill, Clackamas Facilities Tech
- SM = Scott Miller, C-COM Technician
- SS = Sue Scobert, LOCOM 9-1-1 Manager
- TB = Tina Burgess, C-COM Supervisor
- TC = Tony Collins, C-COM Operations Manager
- TRS = Teresa Raihala-Sethe, C-COM D2
- TS = Toni Sexton, C-COM Technical Manager

Appendix B--After Action Review C-COM Employee Survey Results

COM Wildfire After-Action Employee Survey 2020
 Note: Full survey available at
<https://www.surveymonkey.com/results/SM-92993SV57/>

Q1 Given the rapidly changing environment, communication from C-Com leadership in the days leading up to the decision to evacuate was


Answered: 9 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	AVERAGE NUMBER	TOTAL NUMBER	RESPONSES
	52	470	9
Total Respondents: 9			

Q2 Communication from leadership (including supervisors, leads, key decision-makers) during the evacuation was clear. I knew what I needed to do.


Answered: 8 Skipped: 1



ANSWER CHOICES	AVERAGE NUMBER	TOTAL NUMBER	RESPONSES
	64	509	8
Total Respondents: 8			

Q3 Once service was established at LOCOM and WCCCA, I had enough information to make key decisions and do my job.

Answered: 9 Skipped: 0




ANSWER CHOICES	AVERAGE NUMBER	TOTAL NUMBER	RESPONSES
	60	544	9
Total Respondents: 9			

Q4 What, if any, tools or information did you need that were not readily available once the evacuation was complete?

Answered: 7 Skipped: 2

Q5 I had everything necessary to do my job well during the time C-Com operations were located at LOCOM and WAACA


Answered: 9 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	AVERAGE NUMBER	TOTAL NUMBER	RESPONSES
	63	565	9
Total Respondents: 9			

Q6 My direct supervisor or shift lead was accessible during the crisis.

Answered: 9 Skipped: 0




ANSWER CHOICES	AVERAGE NUMBER	TOTAL NUMBER	RESPONSES
	74	668	9
Total Respondents: 9			

Q7 What, of those things that were within our control, was harder than it needed to be?

Q8 What was easier than you expected?

Q9 Upon returning to C-Com, I was able to do my job well.


Answered: 9 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	AVERAGE NUMBER	TOTAL NUMBER	RESPONSES
	73	655	9
Total Respondents: 9			

Q10 The schedule, once established, worked well.

Answered: 9 Skipped: 0



ANSWER CHOICES	AVERAGE NUMBER	TOTAL NUMBER	RESPONSES
	70	629	9
Total Respondents: 9			

Q11 What, from your perspective, should C-Com do differently in the event of another event of similar scope and impact?

Q12 As a result of this event, is there anything that you think C-Com could stop doing under normal operations?

Q13 Who stood out as going above and beyond expectations during this event? What did they do?

Q14 What did you do or experience that should be retained and integrated into normal operations at C-COM in the future?

Q15 Is there anything else that we should know, in the aftermath of this Wildfire event, that will help us grow as an organization? Or, are there any additional comments you would like to make prompted by the questions above?

Appendix C--C-COM Budget Impacts Documents

September 2020 Evacuation Expenses

EXPENSE TYPE	ESTIMATED	ACTUALS
Overtime	\$127,500 = estimated based on 100 hours of OT per day for 17 days	\$113,477.42
Mileage	\$10,000 = estimated high based on full mileage between CCOM-WCCCA for 20 employees for all 17 days	\$1,380.56
Logistical (Hotel)	\$25,500 = swag estimate based on \$1500 per day	\$13,596.26
Logistics (Food)		\$1,583.57
Technology Fixes	\$30,000 = swag estimate	\$15,744.34
After Action Report	\$50,000	\$36,000
CURRENT TOTALS	\$243,000	\$181,782.15

Appendix D--Evacuation Plan Documentation

ANNEX N

FACILITY EVACUATION

Facility Evacuation

The purpose of this section is to provide specific directions to all staff in the event of an emergency requiring the evacuation of the following facilities.

Responsibilities

The Director (Cheryl Bledsoe) shall identify a line of succession, and recognize a "Safe Room" for sheltering in place in the event that this becomes necessary.

The Director (Cheryl Bledsoe) shall be responsible for the following:

- Monitor the evacuation procedures and ensure that all employees are participating.
- Identify themselves to responding emergency personnel and provide any information or assistance, as requested.
- Station themselves outside the facility to receive employee check-off lists from Division Heads/Delegates and to coordinate with emergency personnel as necessary.

The Division Heads/Delegates shall be responsible for monitoring their sections as follows:

- Know the status of all assigned staff, (e.g. are they on site, in the field, or on annual leave).
- Ensure staff are trained in the evacuation procedures and in dealing with clients and staff who may become confused or panic in an emergency situation.
- Assign at least two alternate Division Head delegates and keep this assignment list current.
- Ensure all delegates are properly trained in their duties.
- Obtain checklists of staff accounted for and unaccounted for and report status to the Director (Cheryl Bledsoe) after evacuation.

Staff are responsible for the following:

- Ensuring handicapped employees and visitors are assisted from the facility.
- Staff with public visitors should exit the facility with the visitors.
- Staff must search for and ensure that any clients who are in private rooms, restrooms, etc. evacuate with the staff immediately.

Evacuation Procedures Specific evacuation procedures for each of the facilities identified within this COOP are as follows:

- Primary Facility ◦ CCOM - POLICY NO./TITLE: 01.11: Provides general guidelines for circumstances that may adversely impact the Communications Center personnel to receive, process, dispatch and monitor emergency calls for service.

PROCEDURE:

- I. C-COM will establish and maintain an up-to-date evacuation plan for C-COM in the event the building becomes uninhabitable or if there is a significant loss of functional equipment requiring the re-location to another facility.
- II. The Clackamas County Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) will be used, in conjunction with this policy, to provide guidance and resources for an evacuation.
- III. A full-scale evacuation will be authorized by the Director or Operations Manager. A. In the event where evacuation must happen immediately to avoid endangerment to CCOM employees' life/safety, any employee may initiate an evacuation.
- IV. Rationale for Evacuation A. Relocation of personnel may be required for many specific reasons. The two main factors requiring evacuation of the PSAP are:
 1. Uninhabitable environment
 2. Infrastructure Failure

Uninhabitable Environment 1. Situations which make the Communications Center unsafe for personnel to continue daily operations. These conditions may include but are limited to:

- a) Bomb Threats/Found
- b) Fire/Smoke Condition
- c) Gas Leak
- d) Hazardous Materials
- e) Structural damage

f) Situations during which technical components of the system fail – within or leading to the Communications Center. These conditions may include but are not limited to:

- a) Phone service outage
- b) Radio component outage

Department of Communications (C-COM) Policy & Procedure V. Evacuation Procedures A.

The Director or Designee shall have authority to activate all or any part of the Contingency and Disaster Plan.

On Duty Supervisor

1. Notify off duty staff to respond to alternate site;
2. Direct non committed personnel to evacuate to alternate site;
3. Notify telephone company and when appropriate activate contingency routing of emergency phone calls. Ensure that routing includes both 9-1-1 trunks and Clackamas County Department of Communications
4. Notify radio contractor;
5. Ensure alternate PSAP is staffed/notified of evacuation;
6. Notify other PSAPs of evacuation and termination of direct lines;
7. Ensure all emergency responders are notified of evacuation;
8. Ensure evacuation of all staff;
9. Confirm routing of emergency calls and ability to communicate with emergency responders

On-Duty Dispatchers

- 1) Maintain operations until directed to evacuate;
- 2) Notify emergency responders of relocation;
- 3) Evacuate and report to rally areas for head count;
 - a. C-COM Overflow Parking Lot – Primary
 - b. “Dog Services” Parking Lot – Secondary
- 4) Report to assigned duty station as directed by supervisor

Off Duty Dispatchers

- 1) Report to assigned duty station as directed by supervisor.

Alternate Facility ◦ EOC - To Be Determined ◦ LOCOM - To Be Determined

Appendix E--Tactical Pause Script

THIS MESSAGE TO BE DELIVERED SLOW AND DELIBERATE

ACTIVATE TWO SETS OF EMERGENCY TONES

“CRITICAL SAFETY MESSAGE TO FOLLOW IN 20 SECONDS:”

THIS FIRE EVENT IS A HISTORIC EVENT. IT IS A LIFE RISK PLUME
DOMINATED FIRE.

FIND SAFETY ZONES

LOOKOUTS.....COMMUNICATIONS....ESCAPE ROUTES..... AND SAFETY
ZONES.....IN PLACE AT ALL TIMES

FIND SAFETY ZONE OUTSIDE OF CITIES

TRACK RESOURCES

DISENGAGE ALL FIREFIGHTING ACTIVITIES

ENCOURAGE CITIZEN EVACUATION ON THE WAY OUT

ONCE ALL PERSONNEL ARE IN YOUR SAFETAY ZONE – CONDUCT A PAR

TO BE BROADCASTED ON OPS CHANNEL:

DISPATCH

OPS 24

OPS 25

OPS 26

OPS 27

CLACK A


CLACK B

SIMPLEX 1

SIMPLEX 2

Appendix F—Surge Call Volume Graphics and Data

NOTE: For comparison, September call volume average is typically 800-1000 calls per day



30-Day Running Call Volume

09/01/2020	1418
09/02/2020	1448
09/03/2020	1461
09/04/2020	1487
09/05/2020	1288
09/06/2020	1254
09/07/2020	2999
09/08/2020	4593
09/09/2020	2925
09/10/2020	3322
09/11/2020	2401
09/12/2020	2217
09/13/2020	1552
09/14/2020	1734
09/15/2020	1543
09/16/2020	1451
09/17/2020	1368
09/18/2020	1600
09/19/2020	1194
09/20/2020	1069
09/21/2020	1288
09/22/2020	1555
09/23/2020	1413
09/24/2020	1323
09/25/2020	1265
09/26/2020	1114
09/27/2020	1104
09/28/2020	1299
09/29/2020	1344
Grand Total	50029

SCGI

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